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ABSTRACT 
Relations between organizations are vital for firms and their strategies. A common 
approach organizes interorganizational relationships into competition, cooperation, and 
coopetition. To contribute to this research, in this dissertation I focused on how managers 
interpret competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relations with other organizations. 
Specifically, I studied managers’ interpretations of the characteristics of their interorganizational 
field and relationships, how they identify their competitors and cooperators, and their accounts of 
the practices and aspects involved in the planning and implementation of competitive, 
cooperative, and coopetitive relations. To capture managers’ interpretations, in this study I chose 
a grounded theory approach, selected the seafood processing industry in a Southern US state as 
the empirical setting, and interviewed the executives of seafood processors and representatives of 
other key organizations in this context.  
My findings capture the characteristics of the interorganizational field and relationships 
between organizations; the aspects that managers identify as key to making decisions regarding 
the classification of cooperators and competitors; and the aspects that managers’ interpret to be 
important for competition, cooperation, and coopetition. In doing so, the findings of my study 
contribute to research on interorganizational relationships by studying how managers’ 
interpretations of the interorganizational field and its characteristics shape relations with other 
organizations. Moreover, my findings contribute to this research by exploring the characteristics 
of interorganizational relations and the way managers make decisions and the aspects and 
practices they interpret to be important for competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive 
relationships with certain other organizations. I conclude the dissertation with a discussion of 
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these contributions to the literature on interorganizational relationships, areas for future research, 
and the limitations of the study.  
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CHAPTER 1. INTRODUCTION 
Organizations are embedded in their social contexts and all organizational actions occur 
in relation to other organizations in these contexts (Granovetter, 1985). Therefore, forming 
relations with other organizations and adjusting the nature of these relations is important for 
organizational strategy (Miles, Snow, & Pfeffer, 1974; Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Interorganizational relations have been studied from a variety of perspectives (Grandori & Soda, 
1995; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). A vital approach to research on interorganizational 
relationships organizes these relations into competition, cooperation, and coopetition 
(simultaneous competition and cooperation) (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000; Ketchen, Snow, & 
Hoover, 2004; Padula & Dagnino, 2007). To contribute to this research, in this dissertation I 
focus on how managers experience competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relations with other 
organizations. A focus on managers’ experiences of interorganizational relations can provide 
important insights regarding the way decisions about relations with other organizations are made 
and resources are exchanged between organizations as well as about the factors that lead firms to 
compete and/or cooperate.  
In this study, I follow a stream of research that starts from the premise that economic 
activity is embedded in a social environment (Granovetter, 1985). Starting from this premise, the 
so-called embeddedness perspective assumes that relations between organizations are 
contextualized in a complex environment that includes the social and cultural context, and a 
network of relations with various organizations in this environment (Dacin, Ventresca, & Beal, 
1999). To conceptualize the complexity of the environment in which interorganizational relations 
are embedded, in this dissertation I utilize the concept of interorganizational fields, which are 
defined as the areas of a shared system of interpretations jointly formed by social and economic 
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interactions among organizations (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). An interorganizational field 
consists of organizations that offer similar products, government agencies, suppliers, customers, 
financial actors, industry associations, and the general public who interact with each other more 
frequently than organizations outside of the group (Barnett, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; 
Scott, 2001; Warren, 1967). 
The key decision makers in organizations are managers (Barr, 1998) and their decisions 
are the basis for organizations’ actions, including those that shape interorganizational 
relationships (Van de Ven, 1976). Managers’ interpretations of their environment drive their 
decisions and the courses of action related to forming and implementing organizational strategies 
(Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008; Sharma, 2000). Managers’ interpretations and decisions are 
also impacted by their interactions with other organizations in their field, including for example 
industry organization representatives, customers, and suppliers (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & 
Wincent, 2010; Fuller & Lewis, 2002). Despite their vital role, little attention has been paid to 
managers’ interpretations in the interorganizational relationships literature (Cropper et al., 
2008b; Hibbert et al., 2008). Therefore, more research from an embeddedness perspective is 
needed to shed light on how managers interpret the interorganizational field in which their 
organizations operate and how they accordingly make decisions regarding their organizations’ 
relations with other organizations. Research on managers’ interpretations of interorganizational 
fields and relations with organizations is important because it may inform us about how 
organizations engage in and maintain relations with other organizations, including how resources 
are exchanged and conflicts are resolved (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994; Van de Ven, 1976).   
To address this gap in the literature, I study how managers interpret interorganizational 
relationships in the field. To do so, in this dissertation I rely on managers’ own explanations of 
3 
 
how they interpret their interorganizational field and the organizational practices involved in 
carrying out relations with other organizations. Therefore, this study contributes to a recent 
stream of research that conceptualizes strategy not as a property of organizations, but rather as 
something that managers do (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008). Specifically, I identify and 
examine managers’ interpretations of the practices that are relevant to relations with 
organizations, including for example meeting with managers of other organizations, identifying 
organizations to compete and/or cooperate, and starting relations with other organizations 
through various interactions (Provan & Sydow, 2008). In doing so, in this study I aim to answer 
the following research questions: (1) how do managers' interpretations of their 
interorganizational field and its characteristics shape relations with other organizations? (2) what 
are managers’ interpretations of the characteristics of interorganizational relations and how they 
choose which other organizations to compete, cooperate, and coopete with? (3) what are the key 
aspects of competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships in the experiences of 
managers? 
To address these research questions and study their interpretations of the 
interorganizational field and interorganizational relationships, I interviewed managers based on 
the assumption that they would be willing and able to communicate their interpretations of 
relations with other organizations as well as their experiences of how these relations are planned 
and implemented in their practices (Fuller & Lewis, 2002). As context for my study, I selected 
the seafood processing industry in a Southern state and I interviewed the top-level managers of 
seafood processing companies who are the decision-makers for their organizations to collect data 
about their interpretations of their industry, the relationships among processors and other key 
organizations in the industry. I also interviewed representatives of trade associations, 
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government agencies, fishermen, and distributors to capture their interpretations of the 
interorganizational field and relations between processors.  
This study offers important contributions to the literature on interorganizational relations. 
First, it contributes by combining the literature on interorganizational relations with research on 
interorganizational fields as well as on managers’ interpretations and practices to conceptualize 
their role in studying relationships between organizations. Second, it contributes by studying 
how managers’ interpretations of the interorganizational field and its characteristics shape 
relations with other organizations; a role theorized but only limitedly studied empirically. Third, 
it explores the characteristics of interorganizational relations and how managers make decisions 
regarding relations for competition, cooperation, and coopetition with certain other organizations 
by focusing on managers’ accounts of what they do to plan and implement relations with 
organizations. Finally, it contributes by studying the key aspects that managers interpret to be 
important for competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships in their experiences.  
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. In Chapter 2, I discuss the 
study’s theoretical background; specifically, I synthesize the literature by reviewing relevant 
research on interorganizational fields, on interorganizational relationships and the types of 
relationships between organizations, and on the roles of managers’ interpretations and practices 
for these relationships. In Chapter 3, I present my research design, including methodology, data 
collection, and analysis. In Chapter 4, I discuss the findings of my study and in Chapter 5, I 
highlight the contributions of my study to the literature on interorganizational relationships, 
present the limitations of my study, and provide suggestions for future research.   
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CHAPTER 2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
As a reminder, the purpose of this study is to understand how managers interpret the 
formation and implementation of interorganizational relationships by answering the research 
questions posed in Chapter 1: (1) how do managers' interpretations of their interorganizational 
field and its characteristics shape relations with other organizations? (2) what are managers’ 
interpretations of the characteristics of interorganizational relations and how they choose which 
other organizations to compete, cooperate, and coopete with? (3) what are the key aspects of 
competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships in the experiences of managers? In this 
chapter, I connect the literature on interorganizational relationships and on types of relationships 
with other literature streams, including research on interorganizational fields, managers’ 
interpretations, and practices to develop my study’s theoretical background. I note here that by 
managers I refer to decision makers in their respective organizations. 
Research on the central phenomenon of this study, interorganizational relationships has 
been synthesized in a number of reviews over the years (Borgatti & Foster, 2003; Brass, 
Galaskiewicz, Greve, & Tsai, 2004; Cropper, Ebers, Huxam, & Ring, 2008a; 2008b; 
Galaskiewicz, 1985; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Parmigiana & Rivera-Santos, 2011; Whetten, 
1981). These reviews broadly organized the literature under economics- and sociology-based 
approaches (Grandori & Soda, 1995; Osborn & Hagedoorn, 1997; Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 
2011). Economics-based approaches, such as resource-based view and transaction cost 
perspectives, conceptualize interorganizational relationships as interactions between companies 
based on the evaluations of benefits when conducting an activity against or in collaboration with 
other organizations regardless of the social context. This approach predominantly focuses on 
how organizations can identify appropriate resources and how they can maximize their benefits 
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in interorganizational relationships. In sociology-based approaches, such as embeddedness and 
network perspectives, relations between organizations are considered to be part of a broader 
social context and they are assumed to be impacted by factors such as legitimacy, status, and 
reputation. Additionally, this approach is concerned with relational issues such as trust, prior 
relations and histories between organizations (Parmigiani & Rivera-Santos, 2011). As noted in 
Chapter 1, in this study I focus on a sociology-based approach referred to as the embeddedness 
perspective, the basic premise of which is that all economic actions, including relations between 
organizations, are embedded in a socioeconomic environment that consists of social and 
economic interactions between many actors (Dacin et al. 1999; Hagedoorn, 2006; Uzzi, 1997).  
In the following sections, I start by reviewing the literature on interorganizational fields 
that all organizational actions are embedded in and highlighting important features and elements 
of interorganizational fields for relations between organizations. Then, I continue by defining 
interorganizational relationships and by reviewing the literature on relations between 
organizations in the embeddedness perspective. Next, I discuss a way to organize 
interorganizational relations as conceptualized in the literature (i.e., competition, cooperation, 
and coopetition), and define each type and review related research. Based on this dissertation’s 
focus on managers’ interpretations, I then review the literature on managerial interpretations 
because they constitute the basis for forming and implementing relations with organizations. 
Finally, I touch on the literature on strategy-as-practice because managers’ interpretations of 
their practices as well as the practices of the managers of other organizations in the 
interorganizational field are also important for the formation and implementation of relationships 
between organizations.  
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Interorganizational Fields 
An organization’s strategies and actions are embedded in a broader social context. One 
conceptualization of this social context refers to it as an ‘interorganizational field’, which is 
defined as a group of organizations that have a shared system of interpretations and whose 
members interact with each other more frequently than the organizations outside of the field 
(Scott, 2001; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). An interorganizational field is comprised of a network 
of organizations, including firms that offer similar products, organizations along the supply chain 
such as suppliers and buyers, financial institutions, government agencies, industry associations, 
and the general public, which all have varying levels of influence on a focal organization 
(Barnett, 2006; DiMaggio & Powell, 1983). Therefore, the conceptualization of 
interorganizational fields builds on the concept of industry, defined as groups of organizations 
who offer similar products and services (Nightingale, 1978: 36), “but adds to this focal 
population those other and different organizations that critically influence their performance” 
(Scott, 2001, 56).  
Interorganizational fields are created by organizations’ interactions with each other and 
with other fields to form shared interpretations about the members, dynamics, rules, and routines 
of the field (Meyer & Rowan, 1977). Different organizations may have varying levels of impact 
on the initial formation and transformation of an interorganizational field. For instance, sizeable 
firms with large investments may be more interested in influencing a field and its key dynamics. 
The regulatory agencies overseeing a field’s rules and regulations may have a more important 
impact as coercive forces (Oliver, 1990). Research on interorganizational fields evolved into an 
embedded view that conceptualize fields as ‘relational spaces’ for organizations (Wooten & 
Hoffmen, 2008: 138). These relational spaces, however, are not assumed to be homogeneous and 
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might consist of organizational groups such as industry segments, which may pursue various 
purposes (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 1994; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). 
Interorganizational field is key for the embeddedness perspective because it is the social 
environment that organizations are contextualized. Similar to other organizational actions and 
strategies, relationships between firms are also embedded in and are a vital constitutive part of an 
interorganizational field. Hence, the type and nature of relationships are impacted by the 
interorganizational field while in turn impacting the field itself. Therefore, an understanding of 
the interorganizational field can contribute to theory of interorganizational relationships by 
informing research about the conditions and elements that facilitate or limit relationships 
(Cropper et al., 2008a). While some roles of interorganizational fields are identified and studied 
(Phillips, Lawrence, & Hardy, 2000) there is a call for more research that treats a field as a 
platform that sets the stage for relations between organizations (Cropper et al., 2008b; 
Marchington & Vincent, 2004; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008).  
In the interorganizational field, customers, suppliers, and industry associations are among 
the important elements for relationships between competitors, i.e., firms that have similar 
processes, satisfy similar customer needs by offering similar products or services, and compete 
with each other (Ingram & Yue, 2008). These competing organizations often also become 
suppliers and customers of each other as they may exchange resources or cooperate for other 
issues leading to coopetitive relationships within the field. Industry organizations such as 
associations and government agencies are vital to initiate relations among organizations by 
providing the platforms of communication and by facilitating the formation of key relationship 
characteristics such as trust by facilitating steady and transparent relations (Bachmann & Zaheer, 
2008; Brass et al., 2004). Because the field and its constituents serve as the platform for relations 
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between organizations, building on this discussion I review the literature on interorganizational 
relationships in the following section.  
Interorganizational Relations 
Interorganizational relations are defined as “relationships between and among 
organizations” (Cropper et al. 2008a: 1), and they are important for acquiring necessary 
resources, reducing uncertainty, increasing organizational legitimacy, and achieving 
interorganizational objectives (Brass et al., 2004; Galaskiewicz, 1985). Relationships may be 
between various types of public, private, and/or non-profit organizations.  They also may involve 
relations among only a few or many organizations, including relations among organizations co-
located in geographic clusters or large international networks of organizations. Therefore, the 
umbrella term interorganizational relationships describes a broad array of research across 
different perspectives and streams of literature (Bergenholtz & Waldstrom, 2011; Cropper et al., 
2008a; 2008b; Whetten, 1981).  
As noted above, the theoretical perspective of interorganizational relations that informs 
this dissertation is the sociology-based approach referred to as the embeddedness perspective. 
The rich conceptualization of context in the embeddedness perspective offers a midway 
explanation between over-socialized approaches that attribute the control of interorganizational 
relationships to the external environment and under-socialized approaches that attribute this 
control to the organization’s internal structure (Uzzi, 1997). By combining these approaches, the 
embeddedness perspective suggests that interorganizational relationships occur as part of and in 
relation to the external environment, and they are planned and implemented by key actors within 
an organization (Hagedoorn, 2006). As Dacin and colleagues (1999) masterfully explained, prior 
research on embeddedness predominantly focuses on presenting various boundaries for the 
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rationality of organizational actors by identifying and testing different factors that constitute the 
embeddedness framework. Accordingly, organizations and their interorganizational relationships 
are embedded in their international and national environment, and the social contexts of the 
industry including segments, industry groups, and interorganizational fields.  
Relations between organizations are embedded in the interorganizational field because 
these relations occur as part of a larger network of relations with all the organizations in the field 
and are shaped by interorganizational, organizational, and intra-organizational characteristics. In 
the field, horizontal interdependencies originate when organizations with similar operations that 
offer the same or similar products rely on each other for acquiring or sharing resources for 
example through alliances and trade associations. Vertical interdependencies, on the other hand, 
emerge from supply chain relations linking suppliers and customers through ‘resource-transfers’ 
(Grandori & Soda, 1995).    
Because relationships are embedded, factors such as organizations’ previous interactions 
and their shared interpretations of the interorganizational field are important for subsequent 
relations between organizations. Accordingly, scholars identified a number of key factors that are 
vital for relations between organizations, including trust (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; Brass et 
al., 2004; Vangen & Huxam, 2003), reciprocity (Cropper et al., 2008b; Uzzi, 1997), and 
reputation (Marchington & Vincent, 2004). Trust has been argued to be an essential factor in 
interorganizational relationships and it has also by far been the most commonly studied. Trust is 
defined as an organizational actor’s readiness to accept its vulnerability to opportunistic behavior 
in a relationship, especially non-contractual ones, based on an understanding of a relationship 
partner would be reliable and fair and not act opportunistically at the expense of their benefit 
(Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008; Vlaar, Van den Bosch, & Volberda, 2007). Trust is important in the 
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embeddedness perspective because Granovetter (1985) based his arguments of continuous 
relations between organizations on trust and the lack of constant opportunism. Previous research 
suggests that organizations form trust based on their previous positive interactions with others as 
these interactions imprint strong interpretations on partners (Vangen & Huxham, 2003; Vlaar et 
al., 2007).  
Trust in relationships between organizations is developed through a process: initially 
partners have limited information about each other, but over time they learn about each other and 
develop routines and processes that may be idiosyncratic to their particular relationship and they 
may start to more extensively share information, which may lead to developing positive 
expectations, and eventually to trusting one another (Zhong, Su, Peng, & Yang, 2014). In this 
regard, trust building is a continuous process that is strengthened or weakened by every 
interaction between organizations. Therefore, when organizational actors know each other or 
when organizations have been interacting for a long period of time and are heavily invested in 
the relationship, they will likely avoid actions that would potentially harm their trustworthiness 
(Vangen & Huxham, 2003).  
An important factor for trust building in interorganizational relationships is reciprocity 
(defined as “a pattern of mutually contingent exchange of gratifications”; Gouldner, 1960: 161) 
as managers respond by trusting a partner when they are being trusted: “I trust you because you 
trust me” (Vangen & Huxham, 2003: 9). In addition to its role in building trust, reciprocity also 
is an important factor in relations between organizations as it helps to control and maintain 
relations without relying on contracts because organizational responses to strategic actions are 
mostly similar (in nature and content) to the response they received in the previous interaction 
with the same partners (Uzzi, 1997). This is because a majority of organizational actors are 
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‘reciprocators’ as opposed to being self-interested and they like to see fairness in their relations 
with other organizations (Bachmann & Zaheer, 2008).  
Before trust between partners is established, an important factor that organizational actors 
pay attention to in selecting potential partners and engaging in relations with organizations is 
reputation. Reputation is defined as the shared interpretation of actors in the marketplace 
regarding another actor’s reliability and willingness to engage in and maintain relationships 
(Vangen & Huxham, 2003). An organization’s reputation about its trustworthiness can lead to 
trust in interorganizational relationships in the field (Grandori & Soda, 1995). Therefore, 
reputation impacts and is impacted by the trust towards partners in a relationship. The 
uncooperative actions of an organization within a relationship may also be noticed in the 
organization’s field and thus, may have important implications for this organization’s 
relationships with other organizations (Brass et al., 2004).  
Types of Interorganizational Relations 
Research on interorganizational relationships deals with interactions between 
organizations and as noted above, interdependence between organizations can lead to different 
types of relations. Therefore, to review these relations, I follow previous research and 
accordingly organize and discuss interorganizational relationships under three basic types: 
competition, cooperation, and coopetition (Dowling et al., 1996; Padula & Dagnino, 2007). 
Competition is defined as the interactions between organizations driven by each organization’s 
motive to more efficiently acquire limited resources and opportunities compared to others in the 
environment and to obtain superior performance (Porter, 1980). Cooperation is defined as 
interorganizational relations aimed at deriving mutual benefit by co-utilizing the organizations’ 
complementary resources, skills, and capabilities (Combs & Ketchen, 1999; Thompson & 
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McEwen, 1958). Finally, coopetition is defined as relations in which firms simultaneously 
pursue competition and cooperation with each other (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996). 
However, there may only be a fine line between competition and cooperation depending 
on the context of interorganizational relationships because the same structural conditions that 
shape competition may also lead to cooperation (Ingram & Yue, 2008). For instance, firms are 
likely to compete and cooperate with organizations that have similar resources and structures 
because they are often interdependent with each other when they share a resource base (Barnett, 
2006). Therefore, interrelationships between structurally similar firms are not limited to 
competition, but may also include cooperation and these relationships can co-exist in an 
interorganizational field (Ingram & Yue, 2008). Therefore, a comprehensive examination of 
relations between organizations should pay attention to these relationships together as this may 
lead to a broader synthesis of interactions between different forms of relations and factors that 
impact all these relationships (Cropper et al., 2008b; Dacin et al. 1999). In the following, I 
provide a review of important theoretical advancements for each type of relationship and discuss 
empirical findings for each category.  
Competition in Interorganizational Relations. Competition in interorganizational 
relationships occurs when organizations that satisfy the same customer needs in a market (i.e., 
competitors) seek to acquire scarce resources and/or limited customer demand (Ingram & Yue, 
2008: 276). Specifically, competitive relations take place when groups of firms in an 
interorganizational field have strategic and structural similarities, and when locations, customer 
preferences, or firm resources overlap (Chen & Miller, 2012; Hutzschenreuter & Israel, 2009; 
Ketchen, Snow, & Hoover, 2004). Competition occurs both in the supply market where firms 
compete to acquire limited resources that other organizations also rely on and at the customer 
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market where firms try to satisfy same limited customer needs at a higher profit by offering 
superior products or services relative to their competitors.  
Because organizations are embedded in the interorganizational field, competitive 
relations emerge due to conflicting interests of organizations to acquire limited resources 
available in the field and to gain advantages over competitors (Padula & Dagnino, 2007). Oliver 
(1997) argues that the context that organizations are embedded in and relations with other 
organizations also are key for managers to recognize and utilize the sources of superior 
performance. Organizations’ embeddedness in their interorganizational field that consists of the 
historical, political, cultural, and institutional dimensions of linkages among organizations 
shapes competitive relationships (Dacin et al., 1999). To combine these arguments, firms’ 
success in competitive relationships compared to their competitors will depend on the 
dimensions that constitute their interorganizational field as well as their efficiency in acquiring 
limited resources in the field (Uzzi, 1997).  
  Organizational managers play important roles in competition, such as interpreting the 
field and deciding on and implementing strategies targeted at achieving an efficient cost structure 
or offering value-added products. Because competition is embedded in the interorganizational 
field, previous interactions and factors that have implications for partner selection and 
cooperation such as trust, reputation, and reciprocity are also likely to impact competitive 
relations among organizations (Lado et al., 1997). While the literature on competitive 
relationships is predominantly built on an assumption of conflicting interests between 
organizations, most of the time relations between organizations are not simply limited to 
competition but also include cooperation as will be discussed in detail below.  
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Cooperation in Interorganizational Relations. Cooperation in interorganizational 
relationships occurs when organizations exchange resources and capabilities or utilize them 
together for a joint benefit (Lado et al., 1997).  Cooperation can be between organizations and 
their cooperators, including suppliers, customers, competitors, and other organizations in a field. 
Also, similar to competition, cooperative relations occur either as vertical relationships at the 
supply market where firms try to acquire limited resources from suppliers and at the customer 
market where firms try to reach their customers or as horizontal relationships between 
organizations that offer similar products to exchange information and other resources or for the 
overall advancement of the industry. In synthesizing the literature, Ingram and Yue (2008: 281) 
organize various explanations to cooperative relationships under three categories. First, a 
category of ‘symbiosis’ describes relations in which firms cooperate when they require different 
resources or when they are not really competitors due to being in distinct industry segments or 
geographic locations. Second, the category ‘growth commensalism’ captures relations in which 
firms cooperate when they try to jointly grow a shared resource such as customer demand for a 
product category that all the organizations in the industry would benefit from. The final category 
of ‘exclusion commensalism’ includes relations in which firms cooperate with other similar 
firms for the purpose of excluding other parties interested in the same resources. 
According to reviews on cooperative relationships, previous research under the 
embeddedness perspective focuses on the attributes of partners such as age and experiences, 
organizations’ centrality in the network, resources that are exchanged in relationships, 
governance mechanisms, and the political, institutional, and economic dimensions of an 
interorganizational field (Cropper et al., 2008a; Grandori & Soda, 1995; Hibbert, Huxam, & 
Ring, 2008). Regarding the forms of cooperative relationships, prior research has shown that 
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cooperative relationships can be based on formal contracts such as in mergers and acquisitions, 
joint ventures, franchising agreements, subcontracts such as contractual supplier relations; 
alternatively, they can also be based on non-contractual relations such as in consortia, alliances, 
and trade associations (Lawrence et al., 2002; Marchington & Vincent, 2004).  
Identifying potential partners is key for cooperative interorganizational relations (Cropper 
et al., 2008b; Grandori & Soda, 1995). Managers’ experiences of previous interactions with other 
organizations and the reputations of these organizations serve as the basis for defining these 
partners. In addition to prior interactions, reputation, trust, and reciprocity are also shown to be 
important for deciding on partners and implementing cooperative relationships (Borgatti & 
Foster, 2003; Brass et al., 2004).  Along these dimensions of cooperation, firms can 
simultaneously compete with some of these horizontally or vertically interdependent 
organizations which is referred to as ‘coopetition’ in the literature (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 
1996) and discussed in detail below.   
Coopetition in Interorganizational Relationships. Coopetition in interorganizational 
relationships occurs when firms that compete with each other also cooperate (Bengtsson & Kock, 
2000). Compared to the literatures on competitive and cooperative relationships, coopetition is a 
relatively a more recent area of research, and thus there is relatively limited scholarly progress 
regarding the investigation of this phenomenon (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Similar to 
competition and cooperation, coopetition can occur among organizations and suppliers, 
customers, and organizations that offer similar products and services in an interorganizational 
field. Specifically, coopetition can be between suppliers and customers as vertical relations or 
with rivals (firms that offer same/similar products and services) and complementors (firms that 
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possess or control resources that can complement each other for mutual benefit) as horizontal 
relations (Brandenburger & Nalebuff, 1996; Lacoste, 2012).  
Prior research on coopetitive relationships under the embeddedness perspective focused 
on topics such as the motives, interactions, processes, and outcomes of coopetition at the actor, 
organizational, and interorganizational levels of analysis (Padula & Dagnino, 2007; Peng, Pike, 
Yang et al., 2012). In this research, learning and innovation development have been shown as 
important motives (and, therefore, outcomes) of coopetitive relationships (Van Wijk, Jansen, & 
Lyles, 2008). Because external factors and other motives for competition and cooperation may 
fluctuate, it is challenging for managers to find a balance between these two types of 
relationships when they are interacting with other organizations in the field (Raza-Ullah, 
Bengtsson, & Kock, 2014). Thus, another stream of research deals with ways to balance 
competitive and cooperative relations, suggesting that managers’ interpretations of other 
organizations’ trustworthiness as a factor that can contribute to maintaining this balance 
(Bengtsson & Kock, 2014). Organizational choices between competitive and cooperative 
relationships are based on managers’ interpretations of whichever type of relationship they 
interpret to be necessary for their firms’ benefit and to be fitting with the requirements of their 
organization’s interorganizational field. For example, while managers’ interpretations of market 
commonalities with competitors tend to increase the instances of competition, their 
interpretations of resource asymmetries between competitors tend to boost instances of 
cooperation in the same field (Bengtsson & Kock, 2000).  
Competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships are rooted in the 
interorganizational field, but how relationships are conceptualized and implemented are based on 
managers’ interpretations of the field and its constituents as well as their interpretations of 
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practices for carrying out relationships. Therefore, in the following sections of this study, I look 
at managers’ interpretations of the interorganizational field in addition to their interpretations of 
practices for implementing relations with organizations in the field.  
Managers’ Interpretations of Interorganizational Relations 
In this study I focus on how executive managers in their respective organizations 
interpret and manage interorganizational relations. These managers continuously collect 
information about their organization as well as its environment and they interpret this 
information based on their understanding of the interorganizational field and their own 
organization (Stubbart, 1989). Interpretations are defined as managerial processes “of developing 
models for understanding, of bringing out meaning, and of assembling conceptual schemes” 
(Daft & Weick, 1984: 286) of a variety of factors, events, the capabilities of their own and other 
organizations, and interactions within the organization and in the interorganizational field. 
Norms, institutions, and the resulting characteristics of the field may be interpreted differently by 
the managers of various organizations (Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). As managers’ interpretations 
form the basis for developing strategies and actions including relations with other organizations, 
a comprehensive understanding of interorganizational relationships requires close attention to 
managers’ interpretations (Baum & Lant, 2003; Kaplan, 2013).  
Examples from previous research highlight the importance of managers’ interpretations 
for organizational strategies and interorganizational relationships. Barr (1998) showed that 
managers’ interpretations of regulatory changes in the pharmaceutical industry varied and that 
accordingly their responses to these changes vary as well. Porac and colleagues (1989) found 
that based on their interpretations of their industry, managers in the knitwear industry in Scotland 
defined a group of local competitors that also shaped interorganizational relations; moreover, 
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their interpretations of other organizations in their interorganizational field (competitors, 
suppliers, customers) focused managers’ attention on some transactional partners and not on 
others (Porac et al., 1989). Research on competitive relations highlighted factors that influence 
the attention of top managers in interpreting the moves of competitors and planning their 
responses to them (Marcel et al., 2010). Research on cooperation has shown that managers’ 
interpretations and resulting evaluations of issues, such as trust and reciprocity, shape their 
interpretations of the benefits and costs of cooperation and thus the likelihood of whether or not 
they engage in cooperative relationships (Lado, Dant, & Tekleab, 2008; McAllister, 1995). 
Similarly, managers’ interpretations of potential partners for collaboration facilitate how they 
choose their actual partners (Smith, Carroll, & Ashford, 1995).  
While the interpretations of managers may be impacted by other organizational members, 
because they are the ones who make decisions on behalf of their organizations it is their 
interpretations of the interorganizational field that are central to relations between organizations 
(Kaplan; 2013; Kumar et al., 1993). Having said that, managers’ interpretations are influenced 
by their interactions with other organizations in the interorganizational field, which give rise to 
shared interpretations and a common understanding of the boundaries of the field, membership, 
and the sources of success in the industry (Bogner & Barr, 2000). Thus, research on 
interorganizational relations should also consider the role of other key organizations in the field.   
Additionally, managers’ interpretations of practices for carrying out relations are also 
central to understanding how relationships between organizations unfold in the experiences of 
managers (Sobrero & Schrader, 1998). This is because interorganizational relationships involve 
managers’ interpretations of their own practices as well as the practices of their counterparts in 
other organizations as key activities in making decisions and interacting with organizations in the 
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field. Thus, in this study of interorganizational relations, I combine a focus on managers’ 
interpretations of the interorganizational field with their interpretations of the practices involved 
in engaging in relations with other organizations. Therefore, in the following section, I review 
the literature on managers’ practices and discuss how managers’ interpretations of practices may 
be important for interorganizational relationships.  
Interorganizational Relations and Managers’ Practices 
Formulating and implementing relations between organizations includes not only 
managers’ interpretations of the interorganizational field, but also their interpretations of 
practices performed to engage in relations with organizations (Zajac & Olsen, 1993). Thus, 
managers’ interpretations of their own practices and the practices of their counterparts in other 
organizations are also important for a comprehensive understanding of interorganizational 
relationships in their experiences. To understand the role of these practices for relationships, I 
draw from the ‘strategy as practice’ literature, which assumes strategy as something managers do 
as opposed to something that organizations have (Jarzabkowski, 2004). The three pillars of this 
approach are praxis, which are the individual activities that form strategy; practitioners are those 
who formulate and implement the strategy; and practice which is the entire process of strategy 
formation grounded in the activities of managers (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008).  
Basically, the strategy as practice approach is focused on how and by whom strategy is 
done, the tools utilized to do strategy, and the implications of strategy doing for key 
organizational outcomes. In other words, according to this approach, the strategy making 
includes routinized activities, interactions, and negotiations of various relevant actors as well as 
the specific actions of these actors (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Vaara & Whittington, 2012). 
Some of the practices for developing and implementing strategies studied by earlier research 
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include, for example, meetings of organizational members, meetings with representatives of 
other organizations and/or of other stakeholders, official internal and external documents, and 
strategic decision-making systems. (Jarzabkowski & Whittington, 2008: 282). Empirical research 
in the practice approach finds that managers’ practices have implications both on the matters that 
concern individuals in the organization and the organization’s strategies of how to interact with 
other organizations (Gomez & Bouty, 2011; Jarzabkowski, 2008). Examples of practices that are 
relevant to interorganizational relationships include managers’ accounts of practices for meeting 
with managers of other organizations, choosing other organizations they compete and cooperate 
with, starting relations with other organizations through various interactions, and solving 
problems as part of these relations between organizations (Provan & Sydow, 2008).    
As highlighted by recent reviews on interorganizational relations (Cropper et al., 2008b; 
Hibbert et al., 2008) and on strategy as practice (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009; Vaara & 
Whittington, 2012), little attention has been paid to exploring the role of managers’ 
interpretations of their practices for forming and continuing relations with other organizations. 
Indeed, managers’ interpretations of practices, including practices that involve interactions with 
other managers, are critical for the formation and maintenance of relations between organizations 
(Marchington & Vincent, 2004). Moreover, managers’ practices are situated within an 
organization that is embedded in an interorganizational field (Jarzabkowski, 2004; Kaplan, 2007; 
Vaara & Whittington, 2012). Thus, going beyond understanding managers’ interpretations of 
practices as key activities in making decisions and implementing relations with organizations, 
the practice approach also focuses on managers’ interpretations of interactions with other 
organizations in the interorganizational field, such as with associations, industry leaders, or 
government representatives. In doing so, the practice perspective argues that managers’ accounts 
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of practices should be understood in combination with their interpretations of the interactions 
with other key organizations in the interorganizational field (Jarzabkowski & Spee, 2009). 
Building on this theoretical background, in the following chapters I discuss the details of my 
study that I administered for developing a comprehensive theory of how managers interpret 
formulation and implementation of interorganizational relationships that is grounded in data 
collected from executive managers.  
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CHAPTER 3. RESEARCH DESIGN 
As discussed in detail in Chapter 1, the overarching purpose of this study is to offer 
insights regarding how managers interpret interorganizational relations and the 
interorganizational field that these relations are embedded in. To achieve this purpose, in this 
study I utilize a qualitative approach, specifically the grounded theory methodology. I adopted 
this approach because there is no prior exhaustive theory on relations between organizations in 
the experiences of managers and thus there is a need to develop an analytically structured theory 
of the complex phenomenon of how firms interact with other organizations grounded in 
empirical data. By utilizing grounded theory, I explore how managers describe and interpret the 
interorganizational field and their practices for building and maintaining relationships with other 
organizations in their industry. 
Grounded theory is characterized by developing a theory that is grounded in 
systematically collected and analyzed data (Bowen, 2008; Strauss & Corbin, 1998). In this 
method, data is collected from central actors for the phenomenon (in this study the phenomenon 
of how organizations interact with each other). The researcher develops a comprehensive 
description of the phenomenon of interest as well as actions and interactions within the 
phenomenon (Creswell, 2012). As discussed in detail in Chapter 2, because managers and their 
organizations are embedded in their interorganizational field, they collect information from the 
field, give meaning to this information based on their interpretations of the field and its 
constituents, and accordingly develop strategies and actions including relations with other 
organizations (Kaplan; 2013; Kumar et al., 1993). Thus, research that addresses the phenomenon 
of deciding on and implementing relationships with other organizations requires an attention to 
interpretations of managers’ who are the central actors that experience these relationships first-
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hand (Miller & Friesen, 1983). Managers’ interpretations are also impacted by their 
interpretations of the key elements of the interorganizational field (such as industry 
organizations, customers, suppliers) as they have important implications for the formation and 
implementation of interorganizational relationships (Bengtsson, Eriksson, & Wincent, 2010; 
Fuller & Lewis, 2002). Accordingly, as I will explain in detail below, I relied on semi-structured 
interviews with the top-level decision makers (i.e., owners and/or executive managers) of 
organizations based on the assumption that in small and medium sized organizations that 
dominate the selected field they should be most knowledgeable about the formation and 
implementation of interorganizational relationships. Additionally, I interviewed several 
representatives of other key organizations in the field who are influential for relations between 
organizations as my main source of data. In the remainder of this chapter, I consecutively discuss 
the empirical setting, preparations made before collecting interview data, description of 
interview data collected, and detailed explanation of data analysis.  
Empirical Setting and Data Collection 
Empirical research on interorganizational relations requires selection of a context in 
which organizations have relations with each other (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Moreover, 
research that attempts to address how managers interpret their firms’ environment as they 
develop and implement strategies benefits from studying a spatially condensed industry in which 
there are many interactions between firms (Pettigrew et al. 2001; Porac et al., 1989). In light of 
these requirements, my choice for the study’s empirical setting fell on the geographically 
condensed and relatively tight-knit seafood processing industry in a Southern state of the United 
States. The seafood processing industry in this Southern state relies on the seafood beds located 
in the Mississippi River basin in the Gulf Coast of the Southern state and thus is a relatively 
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geographically condensed industry. Because processors are part of the Southern state’s seafood 
processing industry and they are collocated, these organizations engage in various forms of 
interorganizational relationships with one another.  
To assess the feasibility of the study, to familiarize myself with the context, and to collect 
background information about the industry and processors operating in it, I contacted an industry 
association that is the umbrella association for the seafood industry. I met with the executives of 
the association three times prior to and two times after beginning to collect interview data (I note 
that the management of the industry association changed before I started administering 
interviews). During these meetings I collected overall information about the industry, the number 
and size of companies operating at various levels of the supply chain, other key organizations 
within the industry, and the overall nature of interactions among these companies to assess the 
feasibility of the study in the Southern state’s seafood processing industry context.  
To further familiarize myself with the industry, I collected background information from 
major online news sources and major industry publications. I identified these sources through my 
meetings with executives of the industry association, the sources that managers mentioned 
during interviews as well as online searches. I collected some of this background information 
prior to and during the interviews as necessary and I identified and reviewed relevant articles 
from major online industry sources and publications, including Gulf Seafood News, Seafood 
Source News, Seafood Business, and Seafood News after the majority of the interviews were 
complete. I utilized this background information to identify two interviewees, collect some 
information about interviewees before the interview, and further familiarize myself with the 
industry as these sources provide detailed and up to date material about environmental factors, 
comments of key government officials, changes in rules and regulations, new investments of 
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seafood processors, as well as interviews with key individuals in the industry. In the following 
section, I explain how I developed my interview guide, how I scheduled interviews, and the 
procedures I followed when implementing the interviews.   
Interview Preparations and Design 
 Prior to conducting any interviews, I prepared an interview guide based on my research 
questions. Specifically, to explore how interorganizational relationships are formed and 
implemented in the experiences of managers, I developed questions regarding managers’ 
interpretations of interactions with other processors, specific relationships they form and 
implement with these processors and the role and importance of other key industry elements for 
these relationships. After executing pilot interviews together with my dissertation chair, the 
interview guide was revised extensively based on how questions were received by processors 
and the type of answers they provided (September 7th, 2014). After the majority of interviews 
were complete (30 interviews) and I made some progress on coding the data, the interview guide 
was once again revised (April 3rd, 2015) to better reflect some issues that came up during the 
coding process and this guide was used in the last group of interviews (final 8 interviews). The 
final interview guide utilized for processors is presented in Appendix A; it was slightly adjusted 
to fit the specific needs of other key organizations’ representatives. However, interviews were 
also driven by the answers of interviewees and the follow up questions or probes of some issues 
and concepts to assure they yield content most relevant to the phenomenon of interest in this 
study.  
Prior to beginning of data collection, I secured approval from the Institutional Review 
Board (IRB) at Louisiana State University. To get access to the industry and interviewees, during 
the aforementioned meetings with the previous management of the industry association, I was 
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given a list of seafood processors in the Southern state. Based on my review of this list of 
companies, I focused on 36 companies with more than 10 employees because they were 
relatively larger and well-established, which was needed to explore relationships among them. I 
started interactions first through email and continued with them through email if they responded. 
I called the offices of processors who did not respond to emails; while some agreed to 
participate, others did not return my calls or refused to participate. As a result of this process, I 
was able to recruit 13 owners and/or managers of seafood processors as study participants. My 
efforts also revealed that the list I was provided with by the previous management of the industry 
association was outdated; hence contact information for some processors was no longer up-to-
date and some processors on the list had gone out of business.  
Therefore, in the next step I focused on identifying up-to-date contact information for 
processors on the list and also to identify additional processors and other key organizations in the 
industry not on this list through my contact with the new management of the industry 
association. In addition, I attended three of the industry association’s board meetings (consists of 
members who are leaders of other associations for different species) in August and October 2014 
and in February 2015, respectively and one annual marketing meeting in July 2014. During these 
meetings, I met with new processors and identified new potential interviewees and immediately 
followed up with these processors via email and/or phone to schedule interviews. I identified 
other processors (two) based on my initial scan of the news sources and similarly contacted them 
via email and/or phone. Moreover, I asked the interviewees after each interview for their 
recommendations of other processors that I could interview, with the exception of three 
interviewees who became uncooperative towards the end of the interview; I contacted these 
potential interviewees to request their participation in the study. Most interviews with processors 
28 
 
took place at the offices/processing plants of seafood companies; two took place at interviewees’ 
houses, one at a restaurant, and one at a coffee shop.  
For interviews with key industry organization representatives, I collected contact 
information for them through the official websites of the respective organizations or through the 
current management of the industry association. Among the ones I contacted for an interview, 
the majority agreed; however, some field representatives did not respond and one representative 
of a government agency refused to participate. The interviews with the representatives of key 
organizations took place at their offices, at the university, or at an industry association office.  
Key aspects of the interview (purpose, length, logistics, type of questions, and 
confidentiality) were explained to interviewees during the initial interaction to request and 
schedule interviews through email or over the phone. At the beginning of a meeting for an 
interview, I provided interviewees with an informed consent statement and verbally explained 
other details of the study (procedures, recording of the interview, rights to refuse, privacy, and 
confidentiality of content) before proceeding to the interview. As noted above, my dissertation 
chair joined me for two pilot interviews. Immediately after each of these interviews, we assessed 
my performance during the interview and how I could improve it. Also, for the rest of the first 
group of interviews, I shared the audio files with my dissertation chair and received regular 
feedback from him to improve execution of the interviews and the data collection process. I also 
listened to audio files of the first five interviews to identify my mistakes and rooms for 
improvement. I took notes during every interview and wrote reflections of any observations that 
I made for each interview to keep full records of my observations regarding the context before, 
during, and after each interview which might impact how I should interpret the findings. These 
reflections helped me to comprehend the context of the interviews and understand potential 
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factors that are important for the interpretations of each interviewee. All interviews were fully 
recorded using a digital recorder and transcribed verbatim by a professional prior to analysis. 
Initially, I compared the transcription of the first interview to assess the accuracy of the 
transcription service prior to proceeding with the remaining interviews. I continued to listen and 
compare the audio files with the service provider’s transcription to both familiarize myself with 
the interview content and to check the accuracy of the transcription. In the following section, I 
describe the interview data I collected for this study.  
Interview Data  
The main thrust of my data collection involved conducting 38 interviews in the Southern 
state. This included 30 interviews with owners (25 interviews) and/or managers (5 interviews) of 
seafood processors (Table 1); the size of these owner/managers’ companies ranged from 10-155 
employees. It also included 8 interviews with other key industry organization representatives that 
represent industry associations, universities, marketing agencies, and distributors (Table 2). 
Interviews were conducted between August 2014 and April 2015 at various locations in the 
Southern state and the length of interviews ranged from 45 to 90 minutes, averaging around an 
hour. Three of the processors were also fishermen who had limited processing capabilities and 
informed the study about interactions with these suppliers (in the context of this study suppliers 
primarily consist of independent fishermen and docks). Also, about half of the processors I 
interviewed (14) were vertically integrated to some successive stages of their supply chain (i.e., 
they owned boats, docks or distribution networks). This informed the study regarding the role 
and importance of various stages of the value chain.  
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Table 1: Descriptive Information about Interviewed Processors 
Interviewee  Role Operations Species 
1 
I1 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Oyster Farms, 
Processing & Distribution) Various Species 
2 I2 Owner/Manager Processor Shrimp 
3 I3 Owner/Manager Integrated (Dock & Processing) Bait, Shrimp 
4 I4 Owner/Manager Processor Dried Shrimp 
5 
I6 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Boats, Processing & 
Limited Distribution) 
Shrimp 
6 I7 Owner/Manager Processor Oyster 
7 I8 Professional/Manager Processor Various Species 
8 I10 Owner/Manager Processor Finfish 
9 I11 Owner/Manager Integrated (Dock & Processing) Various Species 
10 I12 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Dock & Processing & 
Distribution) 
Shrimp 
11 I13 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Dock & Processing & 
Distribution) 
Shrimp 
12 
I14 Owner/Manager Processor 
Crawfish, 
Alligator 
13 I18 Professional/Manager Processor Various Species 
14 I19 Professional/Manager Processor Finfish 
15 I20 Owner/Manager Processor Shrimp 
16 I21 Professional/Manager Processor Shrimp 
17 
I22 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Boats & Dock & 
Processing) 
Shrimp 
18 I23 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Boats & Dock & 
Processing) 
Shrimp 
19 I25 Owner/Manager Processor Oyster 
20 
I26 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Oyster Farms, 
Processing & Distribution) 
Oyster 
21 I27 Owner/Manager Integrated (Dock & Processing) Crab 
22 I28 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Boats & Limited 
Processing) 
Various Species 
23 I29 Owner/Manager Processor Shrimp 
24 I30 Professional/Manager Processor Shrimp 
25 
I31 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Boats & Limited 
Processing) 
Shrimp 
26 I32 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Oyster Farms & 
Processing) 
Oyster 
27 I33 Owner/Manager 
Integrated (Dock & Limited 
Processing & Direct sales) 
Various Species 
28 I34 Owner/Manager Processor Shrimp 
29 I35 Owner/Manager Processor Shrimp 
30 I36 Owner/Manager Processor Various Species 
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Additionally, the seafood processing industry in the Southern state consists of various 
segments focusing on different species of seafood and each segment varies regarding the number 
of firms in the segment, their geographic dispersion, presence of foreign competitors, availability 
of resources, and level of local and national demand. Therefore, I interviewed processors from 
each segment; the species that these processors focus on are distributed as follows (see details in 
Table 1): seven companies process various species, 14 process shrimp only, four process oyster 
only, two process finfish only, two process dried shrimp only, one processes crab only, and one 
processes crawfish and alligator which enabled comparison of results within and across species.  
This data enables me to study interpretations and practices that managers state in the interviews 
that lead to relations with other organizations because the content of interviews provides a 
detailed description of how managers interpret the interorganizational field and reveal their way 
of reasoning for particular interorganizational relations. 
As organizations are embedded into their interorganizational field, in addition to 
managers of processors, other key elements in the industry such as industry organizations and 
customers are also central to the formation and implementation of relationships between 
organizations. Thus, I also carried out eight interviews with key organization representatives in 
the industry as they serve important roles in the initiation and continuation of relations between 
processors. These interviewees represent industry organizations, distributors, universities, and 
marketing companies, and I identified them based on recommendations of executives in the 
industry association, the processors that I interviewed and through the industry association 
meetings. (Table 2).  
 
 
32 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Information about Interviewed Representatives of Other Key Organizations 
  Interviewee Role Type of Organization 
1 I5 Field Representative University Extension 
2 I9 Marketing Representative Advertising Company 
3 I15 Field Representative University Extension 
4 I16 Industry Representative Industry Association 
5 I17 Industry Representative Industry Association 
6 I24 Distributor Representative Distributor 
7 I37 University Representative University 
8 I38 University Representative University 
 
Data Analysis 
Grounded theory methodology evolved into different approaches since its introduction 
(Greckhamer & Koro-Ljungberg, 2005; Strauss & Corbin, 1994). In this study I follow the 
approach of Strauss & Corbin (1998), which allows researchers to incorporate previous theory 
and empirical or practical evidence to the theorizing processes with the intention of developing 
an overall framework for the phenomenon of interest. In my analysis I worked iteratively back 
and forth between my interview data, themes emerging in my nodes and memos, and relevant 
prior literature to generate abstract categories and dimension that form grounded theory 
following the Strauss and Corbin approach. Also in line with Strauss and Corbin (1998), I 
followed a three-stage data coding process (open, axial, and selective coding) with the ultimate 
purpose of creating a detailed story of how relationships between organizations occur in the 
experiences of managers. Consistent with the constant comparison method, I compared the data 
within each interview, between interviews, within and between codes, and previous instances to 
new instances (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Also, to explore any meaningful differences regarding 
interactions of organizations among each other, I compared instances based on attributes of 
interviewees: processors vs. other key organizations, professionals vs. owner-managers, or across 
industry segments (i.e., species). In the following sections, I present details of procedures I 
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followed in each coding stage and discuss how I address the criteria of trustworthiness for my 
data analysis.  
Open Coding  
Before starting the coding process, I closely read the first three interviews to familiarize 
myself with the content and explore recurring themes across interviews to identify potential 
nodes. Then, following the Strauss and Corbin (1998)’s recommendation, I started a detailed 
sentence by sentence analysis (“micro-analysis”) of these three interviews to generate initial 
nodes. I applied “micro-analysis” when dealing with more confusing data passages in the later 
stages of the analysis as well. In this process, I tried to evaluate each statement (or at times even 
the words) to understand the unique meanings of each instance in the data, paid attention to the 
importance of a passage as well as concepts and constructs in the prior literature to accordingly 
develop the initial node structure. In this stage, I created as many nodes as possible that I 
believed had some connection to my phenomena of interest. I labeled the nodes with brief 
descriptive concepts (at times these were “in vivo” labels directly mentioned by the interviewee) 
that best reflect the content (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 105). I also wrote a brief description of 
each node that explains how I interpret this node and what is coded in each node.  
After I coded the first three interviews, I shared the list of nodes as well as some 
representative node contents with my dissertation chair, who provided feedback regarding the 
overall list of nodes as well as the specific content of each node and ways to improve the coding. 
Following his feedback, I dropped a focus on hierarchical relations as this was limiting my 
coding process at this early stage and can be better done in the later stages of the analysis, 
relabeled some nodes, merged some nodes with other similar nodes with considerable overlap, or 
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split content of some nodes into multiple nodes if the content reflected multiple types of 
instances.   
After an initial node structure emerged, I proceeded to coding the rest of the interviews, 
periodically shared the node structure with my dissertation chair, received feedback, and 
accordingly worked on improving the node structure as well as the coding of interviews into 
nodes. Based on his feedback, I vertically (within node) coded each node to make sure the entire 
content was consistent with the node label and description and each passage in itself was a 
meaningful representation of the node. After the initial coding of about 20 interviews, I created a 
comprehensive excel file that included a list and detailed description of all nodes, rationales for 
their inclusion, representative data samples, and other notes. My dissertation chair provided 
several rounds of comprehensive feedback on this summary document of the whole node 
structure as it was progressively revised and refined, and in this process I substantially changed 
the node structure, eliminated nodes that were not central to the phenomenon of study, relabeled 
some nodes, merged some nodes with other similar nodes with considerable overlap, or split 
content of some nodes into multiple nodes if the content reflected multiple types of instances.  
During the coding, I highlighted passages that I was having difficulty in classifying into 
nodes, passages that I thought was important but was not sure if they were central to the 
phenomenon of study, and annotated the passages that I thought had important implications for 
my research. I also created memos and copied passages across interviews for the things that I 
believed could be important, but did not yet discover enough substance to create nodes for. 
When I believed a memo achieved to a point that had enough substance and was central to my 
research, I created a node out of it.  
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Axial Coding  
The purpose of this stage is restructuring the interview data that was classified in the 
open coding stage by relating categories to their subcategories based on their content, 
dimensions, and attributes. In the axial coding, a researcher tries to answer questions of “why”, 
“how” and “with what outcome” for each category and building on answers of these questions 
tries to reveal the relationships among these categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998: 127). The 
question of why refers to the conditions for the phenomenon of interest in each category occurs, 
the question of how relates to the interactions between key actors in response to these conditions 
and the question of with what outcome relates to the consequences of these interactions. 
Therefore, concurrently answering these questions inform the researcher both about the structure 
and details of how a phenomenon of interest unfolds in the experiences of key actors as well as 
potential outcomes of this phenomenon (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). Through the implementation 
of axial coding, categories are grouped into themes that are represented with more abstract 
theoretical labels and utilized as the building blocks of emerging theory. Also, this stage helps to 
translate the instances that interviewees mentioned into the concepts relevant to the management 
literature that this research contributes to (Rogers, 2012).  
For axial coding, I worked on the original node structure and vertically (within node) 
examined each node to ask aforementioned questions to uncover underlying themes as well as 
the role of each node for the emerging theory. I identified conditions for the phenomenon of 
interest to occur, actions/interactions that take place, the consequences of these 
actions/interactions from the nodes. As part of these details I also identified ideas about key 
organizations and key practices for interorganizational relationships by asking questions of who, 
what, when, how, why, and with what outcome as described by Strauss and Corbin (1998) all of 
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which were also potentially important factors for my intended contributions for the study. 
Following the constant comparison method, I also identified ideas regarding how to compare 
interactions within and across layers (industry segment, local seafood processing industry, and 
national seafood processing industry). As suggested by Strauss & Corbin (1998), at this stage I 
started focusing on hierarchical relations among categories that form the building blocks of 
theory and assigning nodes under these categories as they fit within categories and among each 
other. Similar to the open coding stage, to assure the accuracy of axial coding, I shared detailed 
reports of this coding regularly with my dissertation chair and made adjustments in the process 
and content of axial coding based on his detailed feedback over multiple rounds.  
Selective Coding 
This stage is the final process of integrating and refining the categories and identifying 
the relationships across categories that underlie the story of grounded theory to identify 
theoretical links between nodes and categories (Strauss & Corbin, 1998). The researcher 
interprets and refines categories during all the stages of data analysis, but finalizes them in the 
selective coding stage. Selective coding involves building a theoretical story line around these 
categories generated in the axial coding stage by focusing on the relationships between these 
categories.  
Building on the actions/interactions, consequences, key actors, key groups of actors, and 
key practices I developed in the axial coding stage, at this stage I focused on combining these 
details with the purpose of developing insights regarding how managers interpret 
interorganizational relationships. Accordingly, I developed an overview of findings that 
represents theoretical links between individual categories as discussed in detail in the following 
sections. I shared the evolving category and node structure regularly with my dissertation chair 
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and based on his feedback I continuously updated categories, nodes fitting under each of these 
categories, and how categories may be interrelated to each other in the overall theoretical 
framework. I also developed an outline document for the results that summarizes various 
potential links between emerging categories of the grounded theory and revised this document 
based on feedback I received from my dissertation chair. Also, at this stage I performed another 
detailed review of literature also in light of my findings, in addition to the detailed literature 
review I performed prior to data collection and analysis. I utilized this extensive literature review 
for comparing and contrasting my findings with existing theory and research on 
interorganizational relationships to highlight similarities as well as potential for contributions in 
developing the grounded theory of interorganizational relationships in the experiences of 
managers. For all the stages of data analysis, I used the Nvivo 10 qualitative analysis software. 
Nvivo helped me to organize a large amount of data, code the interviews, analyze the data 
through memos and annotations, and develop theoretical links among nodes. I was able to 
horizontally (within interview) and vertically (within node) analyze the data and use annotation 
and memos to highlight emerging interpretations, important instances, and unclear issues.  
Assessing Trustworthiness 
I followed the criteria that Shah and Corley (2006) elaborated based on a translation of 
the traditional criteria for rigor in research studies (i.e., internal validity, external validity, 
reliability, and objectivity) for qualitative research (i.e., credibility, transferability, dependability, 
and confirmability respectively). The way I addressed each of these criteria is explained below:  
Credibility. This criterion for trustworthiness requires the researcher to have a 
substantial understanding of the context as well as debriefing with colleagues at various stages of 
data collection and analysis (Shah & Corley, 2006). A detailed understanding of the context is 
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achieved through various information sources as well as interactions with industry organizations 
and industry representatives as explained in the section on the empirical setting. Peer debriefing 
requirement was fulfilled by continuously sharing the emerging code structure with my 
dissertation chair as explained in detail above.  
Transferability. This criterion for trustworthiness requires that the researcher develops a 
detailed description of each category in the grounded theory to assess the applicability of this 
theory to other contexts (Shah & Corley, 2006). From the beginning of the data analysis, I 
developed detailed descriptions of each node that explains how I interpret this node and what is 
coded in each node as well as some notes, questions, or concerns I had about these nodes. Also, I 
kept detailed records of all the processes that I went through during the data collection and 
analysis stages to assure transferability.  
Dependability. This criterion is related to reliability in traditional research and requires 
purposive and/or theoretical sampling, assuring confidentiality of data, and rigor in data 
collection and analysis processes. Data collection section explained the steps taken for purposive 
selection of the sample (including at times consulting to central figures of the industry as 
explained) to collect data that is central to my phenomenon of interest. To assure confidentiality, 
all data was kept in the possession of the researcher in a private office and only on password 
protected computers. Data was only shared with my dissertation chair (who was included in IRB 
approval and informed consent forms provided to participants as co-investigator) and with a 
professional transcriptionist who signed a confidentiality agreement before starting to receive the 
interviews for transcription. In the presentation of findings any information that could potentially 
identify interviewees has been removed.  
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Confirmability. To achieve this criterion of trustworthiness, the researcher is expected to 
carefully manage data collection and recording, fully transcribe the interviews and keep detailed 
records of interviews, and notes on key theoretical and methodological decisions. As elaborated 
in detail above, I followed strict procedures in sampling, collecting and handling data, as well as 
in analyzing it. As explained in detail in the data collection section, all interviews were fully 
recorded and transcribed verbatim and I kept detailed notes for each interview. I also kept details 
of my data analysis process and kept a log of major decisions that were made through the process 
of coding and analyzing data.  
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CHAPTER 4. FINDINGS 
In this chapter, I present the results of my study. As a reminder, in this study I seek to 
answer the following research questions: (1) how do managers' interpretations of their 
interorganizational field and its characteristics shape relations with other organizations? (2) what 
are managers’ interpretations of the characteristics of interorganizational relations and how they 
choose which other organizations to compete, cooperate, and coopete with? (3) what are the key 
aspects of competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships in the experiences of 
managers? I designed my study to answer these questions.  
All the findings discussed in this chapter are based on managers’ interpretations of issues 
related to interorganizational relationships. I organize these findings following the grounded 
theory logic. Following Strauss & Corbin (1998), through the three-stage coding process 
discussed in Chapter 3, I created nodes by combining references from interviewees about a 
specific theme and labeled these nodes with descriptive concepts that best reflect the content. 
Then, I assigned nodes under categories as the contents of these nodes fit within the categories 
and among each other to create a hierarchical structure that form the building blocks of theory. 
The order of categories roughly reflects the theoretical order of relations among nodes and 
categories. To support the findings in each node, I utilize verbatim quotes from interviewees. 
Additionally, I discuss key connections each node has with other nodes and categories only after 
both nodes and/or categories are introduced in the chapter. To assure confidentiality, all names of 
interviewees are anonymized and represented with abbreviations (Interviewee 1, Interviewee 2, 
…, Interviewee 38), which reflect the order in which I conducted the interviews. Similarly, the 
names of industry organizations are anonymized in the text and in the quotes and represented 
with abbreviations (Association 1, Association 2, …, Association 12). The presentation of 
41 
 
findings in the remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I start by discussing managers’ 
interpretations of the characteristics of the interorganizational field and the key aspects that 
underlie relations between organizations. I then proceed to explain the aspects that managers 
identify as key to making decisions regarding the classification of cooperators and competitors. 
Finally, I discuss the aspects that managers interpret to be key for cooperation for industry 
issues, coopetition for business issues, and competition respectively.  
 Characteristics of the Interorganizational Field 
The first category of my findings captures characteristics of the interorganizational field 
that, from the interviewed managers’ point of view, have key impacts on relations between 
organizations as well as on the dynamics of competition, cooperation, and coopetition. These 
characteristics set the stage for how managers plan and implement their firm’s relations with 
other firms. According to managers’ interpretations, these characteristics include the challenges 
they experience regarding supply; the seasonality of supply, demand, and natural factors; the 
fragmented nature of the industry; the roles of trade associations, universities, suppliers, and 
customers for information transfer; the non-contractual relationships processors have with their 
suppliers; the role and power of big customers for relations; and trade associations’ and 
government agencies’ roles as platforms for managers to initiate relations and network with other 
firms in the field. I now discuss each of these field characteristics and their implications for 
interorganizational relationships in the interpretations of managers.  
Challenges with Supply 
The first characteristic of the interorganizational field that managers interpret as vital for 
relations between firms regards field-wide challenges with the supply of seafood. According to 
managers, processors in the field focus on processing and selling fresh-caught seafood and rely 
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on natural resources from the Gulf of Mexico for their operations. The availability of these 
natural resources may fluctuate due to various factors such as salinity and water temperatures. 
This is illustrated by the following quote from a manager: 
You know its supply and demand. (…) It’s all the determining factors. With our industry 
it’s not as safe. Telling us that we are going to get. It’s all up to Mother Nature. The 
conditions of salinity, temperature, water temperatures, hurricanes. (Interviewee 20) 
 
Interviewees assert that periods of supply shortage result in the occurrence of relatively 
less cooperation due to a reluctance to share information among the firms directly competing in 
terms of getting the supply. On the other hand, they see these periods of shortage of supply as 
easing the competition for selling their products because processors enter into a mode where they 
do not seek to grow or invest but to survive and continue their current operations. During these 
periods, processors try to primarily satisfy and keep their existing customers and are less likely to 
approach their competitors’ customers as illustrated by a manager:  
(…) There’s not, there’s probably less a that [customers being approached by a 
competitor] now because they’re not able to satisfy new customers cause their supply is 
as low as anyone’s, as mine, so they’re just trying to satisfy their, the customers that they 
have, to, with enough product to keep em. (…) (Interviewee 26) 
 
Interviewees suggested that the challenges of supply not only impact relations between 
firms in the immediate context but also that under these circumstances processors communicate 
and establish relations with each other and with suppliers located in other regions (e.g., east 
coast, west coast, and other countries) to expand their potential sources of supply. Put differently, 
challenges with supply pushes managers to reach out to managers of other processors. This is 
important because it shows how the challenges with supply may lead to new relationships 
between firms as exemplified below:  
 (…) We’ve had to expand our, you know, our supply base and going to the east coast. 
Some people have even went out to the west coast for pretty much a meat, meat product 
[of oyster] not so much to shell. (…) (Interviewee 26) 
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Seasonality of Factors in the Field 
In addition to many other natural factors, seasonality is among the reasons for challenges 
with supply discussed in the previous node, but I captured seasonality as a separate node because 
it is also closely related to fluctuations in customer demand, product prices, industry relations, 
and regulations. Managers state that their interorganizational field is exposed to seasonal trends 
in environmental factors, resources, and, customer demand. The seafood industry operates in 
seasons that are broadly defined by the availability of supply and officially set by government 
agencies with the specific season start and finish dates for each species. To deal with this 
seasonality, processors buy and sell fresh products during the season and keep inventory of 
frozen products for off-season periods as illustrated by the following quote from a manager:  
(…) the way that this business works is it’s very seasonal and cyclical. Our primary 
source of income comes from harvesting as much product as possible during the 
harvesting seasons and we inventory when supply is limited. (Interviewee 11) 
 
Managers’ interpret the seasonality of factors in the interorganizational field to have 
important implications for competition between processors for supply during the off-season and 
during the seasons of peak demand; for cooperation with suppliers, customers, and regulators; 
and for coopetition between processors. When the officially defined season for a species starts, 
seafood processors tend to compete intensively for supply and for demand, and when the season 
ends they are more likely to cooperate with each other. Moreover, the interpersonal interactions 
between managers are more collaborative during the off-season while tensions rise during the 
season as highlighted by an industry association representative:  
(…) we met with shrimp processors, we met with them in the off-season, and so they 
were very kind to each other, and it was a real brotherhood kind of feeling. And they told 
us, they said, during the season when we're competing, it's not so pretty, and they can be 
very rough with each other at that point, and very competitive (…) (Interviewee 16) 
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Seasonality is important for relationships in the interpretations of managers also because 
it has important implications for firm resources and the price levels of seafood processors’ 
products. Specifically, product prices are much lower during the season when plenty of products 
are available to every firm in the field, but it goes higher during the off-season when there is a 
relatively low level of fresh supply. The seasonality of seafood prices enables processors who 
have the means to purchase a large quantity of supply in season and store it until the off-season 
to create an important competitive advantage for themselves, as explained by a manager:  
(…) they [processors] could just harvest shrimp, put it in the freezer, take as much -- 
every day, buy as much as you could buy, put it in the freezer, and in December and 
January, sell it for a big profit. (Interviewee 8) 
 
According to managers, customer demand for products may present seasonal differences 
as well. According to the interviewed managers, this is important for interorganizational 
relationships because there are intense cooperative relations with other processors to acquire 
resources during these periods. During peak customer demand, market prices for supply rise due 
to increased demand, which may lead suppliers to start selling to other processors for a higher 
return. Hence, during these periods, managers need to plan carefully and try to utilize the long-
term relationships with suppliers to be able to acquire enough seafood to meet their customers’ 
demand as shown below:  
You know, like this weekend coming up is going to be a very busy weekend.  Last 
weekend was a very busy week because of the Lent.  (…) I got to have enough on hand to 
supply my regular customers. (Interviewee 36)  
 
 Finally, managers highlight the implications of the seasonality of factors in the field for 
coopetition between processors. For instance, the time and amount of inventory firms buy from 
and sell to other processors changes across seasons. When seafood supply is abundant during the 
season, firms do not rely on each other for acquiring necessary resources. However, as the season 
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gets closer to the end and the amount of supply starts diminishing, processors rely more and 
more on each other’s resources to satisfy customer needs and start more intensely buying and 
selling inventory among each other, as illustrated by a manager:  
[Interactions among processors] Very, very little. (…). When production is extremely 
low, and you get towards the end of the season, where not a whole bunch of people have 
inventory, they'll actually purchase inventory from each other. (…) (Interviewee 23) 
 
Fragmentation of the Industry 
Another vital characteristic of the studied interorganizational field according to the 
managers I interviewed is what they describe the fragmented nature of their industry. Managers 
explain that the seafood processing industry is not homogeneous and that it consists of different 
segments with varying structural characteristics. The major way managers segment the industry 
is based on the different seafood species they process and sell (e.g., shrimp, oyster, alligator, 
finfish). A quote from a manager illustrates this fragmentation of industry segments across 
species below:  
You know, I think that the idea of the (…) [Southern State’s] seafood industry is 
somewhat of a misnomer. It -- there is a -- there's a shrimp industry. There's a crab 
industry. There's a fin fish industry, etc. Oyster industry (…) (Interviewee 8) 
 
The way business and relationships are interpreted and implemented by managers differ 
across these industry segments. In managers’ interpretations, even though all processors in 
different industry segments have interactions and are part of the same interorganizational field, 
different conditions in each industry segment lead to differences in nature and content of 
relationships between firms. The type of seafood species that an industry segment relies on, and 
the abundance and availability of supply for that species in a geographic region is a major reason 
for the differences in interorganizational relations in each industry segment; this is illustrated by 
the following quote from a manager:  
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(...) Shrimp is probably the best of all the seafoods. Fin fish as well, because both can--
they can move in and out. They may come inshore certain times of the year, but they live 
offshore. (…) Oysters don't move. Crabs, you know, lay their eggs out, but then they 
come back in to live, you know, they go right at that high-solidity freshwater line. (…) So 
the interaction is very different with all the different fisheries. (Interviewee 25) 
 
To synthesize managers’ interpretations regarding the fragmentation of the industry, they 
underline the presence of four different kinds of industry segments, represented in the context of 
this study by the oyster, shrimp, crawfish, and crab industry segments respectively. In this 
synthesis, I repeatedly draw on Interviewee 8 who provided a concise description of these kinds 
of segments, which were also supported by the interview data more generally. To begin with, the 
first kind of industry segment includes a relatively small number of processors, which share 
customer markets and is relatively isolated from foreign competition. For example, in the oyster 
industry segment, firms compete intensely for demand and for supply, and cooperate strongly at 
the segment level. The well-defined and concentrated nature of the oyster industry segment is 
explained by a manager: 
The oyster industry.  Probably, there are about three or four processors or distributors, 
that process and distribute 70% of the product.  So, that industry has the unique feature of 
being somewhat small and defined, and their leaders have been very much involved in 
the formation of the Association 1.  (…) So they coordinated efforts between all of the 
Gulf states.  (…) I find the oyster industry, (…) the most organized. (Interviewee 8) 
 
Because both competition and cooperation are very intense in the oyster industry 
segment, according to managers seasonality becomes an important issue for relationships. 
Consistent with the discussion in the previous node, during the season firms in this segment are 
intense competitors, but during the off-season, they fight alongside for industry issues, especially 
for the sustainability of their resource bases. These firms still have limited cooperation during the 
season for buying and selling inventory, specifically when a processor’s source of supply 
becomes unavailable due to natural factors.  
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According to managers’ interpretations, the second kind of industry segment consists of 
firms that solely focus on a particular species and is subject to intense competition from 
companies that sell imported seafood, such as the shrimp industry segment; firms compete 
directly if they are selling in the same customer markets (such as the same metropolitan area) and 
to the same type of customers (for example to restaurants). There is limited cooperation among 
these firms for the overall benefit of the industry because the managers of only a small number 
of processors participate in industry-related matters. The same manager summarizes some 
features of the shrimp industry segment in the following quote: 
The shrimp industry is the largest, in terms of value, and in terms of individuals 
harvesting.  So you have a much larger group of people who are -- and you'll find 
conflicts between the in-shore boats versus the off-shore boats; the dock-side buyers, who 
are buying from the shrimpers, who are then selling to processing plants (…) the shrimp 
industry is the most important, but it's behind the eight-ball.  Because the amount of 
imports continue to grow, and there's very little effort, I think, to organize the industry, or 
for the industry to become organized, and there's not truly what I'll call leadership among 
the processors, or among the shrimpers themselves, to work harmoniously for the 
betterment of the industry. (Interviewee 8)  
 
The third kind of industry segment is crowded with many firms with limited processing 
capabilities that sell directly to the public and have limited threat from foreign competition such 
as the crawfish industry segment; this kind of segment deals with intense, price-based, 
destructive rivalry with low profit margins as illustrated by a manager below:  
They [new entrants] heard about their cousin, or they see [a processor] successful hauling 
crawfish, so they buy a truck and they’re gonna be a crawfish hauler. (…) And they show 
up and realize: “Oh, my goodness! I need to lower my price because I don’t have a 
market.” They’ll disrupt the market on a real local level for between 10 or 15 restaurants 
because they went around the block and peddled their crawfish at the back door for 10 
cents below cost. (…) It happens with crawfish a lot because there’s a huge market. (…) 
Crawfish is just an easier commodity for that to happen with because it’s live, most of it’s 
sold live, it doesn’t get processed. Whereas the other items, you’ve gotta do something to 
them; you’ve gotta take them to the next stage for them to be useful for the restaurant. 
There’s no guys out there peddling tuna (…) (Interviewee 1) 
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 Finally, the fourth kind of industry segment that consists of a small number of 
established processors that almost exclusively share their customer markets and suppliers. For 
example, in the crab industry segment, managers consider interorganizational relations to be 
shaped by more intense competition and limited cooperation. In short, according to managers, in 
this study’s context firms in the same industry segment tend to have similar needs and objectives 
and thus, relationships are relatively limited to within industry segments. Moreover, due to the 
fragmentation of the industry, when it comes to issues of a particular industry segment, primarily 
processors that are part of that industry segment will be involved in addressing those issues as 
illustrated below:  
That is to say that the problems of the crab industry are the problems of the crab industry. 
The shrimpers don't become involved in that.  What causes problems for the fin fish 
industry does not necessarily impact the oyster industry. So, there's these little, you know, 
islands of industry, that have very little cooperation (…) (Interviewee 8) 
 
Information Transfer 
Managers underline another key characteristic of the interorganizational field as the 
organizations that serve important roles in information transfer, which in turn is central to 
relationships between processors. Managers state that suppliers (which includes independent 
fishermen and docks), industry associations, universities, and customers have key roles for 
information transfer between processors in my study’s context. Transferred information can be 
about the industry, seasonal developments, migration patterns of species of interest, prices, 
availability of different product sizes and actions of competitors. Managers learn about the 
majority of the developments in the field from these key channels of information exchange and 
use this information to plan and implement competitive moves or to share with managers of 
other processors and cooperate:  
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(…) through (…) communicating with other processors alike, other factories, docks, 
fishermen (…) we learn about the season, what it’s looking like out there, if the product is 
moved in. If it’s moved out and migrated, certain species migrate at certain times of the 
year. (…)  We learn about the availability of the sizes - certain sizes out there. (…) 
(Interviewee 11) 
 
According to managers, especially fishermen are connected through a strong network and 
word travels very fast in this network. Due to this network, when a processor increases the 
purchasing price from fishermen, word quickly travels and triggers a chain of interactions among 
processors, their customers, and the docks (i.e., facilities that are owned either by independent 
businessmen or by processors and used by fishermen to unload their catch); fishermen call docks 
and/or processors to see if they would match the increased price, managers of processors check 
with their customers to see if they are able to increase prices, and if their customers agree, 
processors or docks increase the price paid to fishermen.  
Regarding the implications of this unofficial network for competition, managers of 
seafood processors explain that suppliers can use their network to bring valuable market 
information, but they also can carry important business information to competitors, which may 
have important consequences for competition. According to managers, suppliers transfer 
information, especially if they are more loyal to another processor and they can use this 
information as a way to strengthen the relationship with that processor. Because fishermen are 
very well connected and spread information fast, they can quickly drive up prices among docks 
that are close to each other. To deal with this problem, processors that are located close to each 
other actually shut down their own docks and either jointly use another processor’s dock or they 
work with a central independent dock that collects from a large number of fishermen as 
illustrated by a manager below:  
I purchase my product--I do not purchase at my dock (…) if I buy here, and I'm forced by 
some of the buyers here to pay an extra nickel or dime, well that's in the news in about 
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five minutes, so the next time I go anywhere else to buy, I got to pay what I paid here. So 
I'm better off not buying here--and I put a fence around my dock, and you'll see a lot of 
large plants did the very same thing, that are located on a good bayou and they don't buy 
in their back fence because it's almost better to do it from the collector's standpoints. 
(Interviewee 29) 
 
Additionally, managers perceive that industry associations have an important role in 
transferring information between processors as industry associations’ meetings serve as 
occasions for managers to exchange information and learn about the developments in the 
industry. Managers benefit from universities generally for getting information about new 
techniques and technological equipment for handling and processing seafood. Managers also 
regard customers as important sources of information. Most importantly, managers learn about 
other processors, what they offer, some of the changes they make to their products, new 
technologies they use, and current market price from these customers, which are very important 
for competitive relationships between processors as explained by a manager in the following 
quote:  
We know who [other processors] is in quality [has quality product] and who is not. We 
find that out through our customers. (…)  It’s not hard to find out what your competition 
is doing. We talk to the customers. You can get a feel for what’s going on if you get a 
feel for what’s going on in your industry. Your business. (Interviewee 20) 
 
Non-contractual Relations with Suppliers 
Another key consideration that emerged from my interviews is the centrality of non-
contractual relations for interorganizational relationships in this field. The managers that 
participated in my study consider the non-contractual relations, especially that they have with 
their suppliers as a vital characteristic of their interorganizational field. They highlighted that 
while contractual relationships could be controlled by various enforcement mechanisms, non-
contractual relationships require the building of long-term relations with suppliers. Processors 
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very rarely have written contracts with their suppliers, and therefore, these suppliers can choose 
among processors to sell their product on an everyday basis, as illustrated by a manager:  
They’re all independent fishermen. (…) No agreements; they’re all independent 
fishermen and they just, you know, just word of mouth. That’s it. Doing business with 
word of mouth, that’s all. (Interviewee 34) 
 
Some managers do not deal with individual fishermen, but buy from docks, which in turn 
purchase products from multiple fishermen. These relationships are also non-contractual and not 
exclusive to a particular processor. The difference of docks is that they are not mobile and they 
have to deal with price-driven negotiations with the fishermen themselves; docks then charge 
these increased prices to processors when they are selling to them. In managers’ interpretations, a 
special feature of relationships between fishermen and docks is that docks can provide various 
services (e.g., ice, gas, equipment, etc.) or help them (e.g., lend money); in return, fishermen 
bring their catch to these docks as illustrated by the manager of an integrated dock and 
processing facility:  
But we take care of them [fishermen]. (…) we’ve made it a priority to make sure that we 
take care of the boats that unload with us.  Meaning, if they have problems, a lot of times 
if they need to borrow money, a lot of times they need something big so they need me to 
order something online.  They – you name it, I do it. (Interviewee 22) 
 
Managers interpret that due to the lack of contracts between suppliers and processors, 
transactions are mostly based on negotiations. This is another factor that contributes to the 
challenges with supply that processors face as discussed above. The lack of a contract is not only 
due to the established traditions of doing business in the seafood industry, but also a result of the 
preferences of processors and suppliers to minimize their risks. If a processor relies primarily on 
a small number of suppliers, it would be difficult to have a steady inventory because fishermen’s 
catch may fluctuate daily. If a supplier relies mainly on a processor they may not be able to sell 
their catch every day because a processor’s customer demand fluctuates as well. Therefore, this 
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shared decision to avoid contractual relationships minimizes the risk by not limiting processors 
to a small number of suppliers or suppliers to a limited number of buyers as explained by a 
manager:  
I wouldn't even recommend any of my suppliers just count on one supplier -- or one 
buyer. It's not good business.  It's just too risky.  There's just something -- he could die 
tomorrow.  You've got to have the -- in anything that I ever do, I develop my back door 
before I open my front door.  I want to know how I'm going to get rid of it if I can't sell it. 
(Interviewee 14) 
  
According to managers, fishermen are technically free to go to other docks and 
processors, which intensifies the competition for supply between firms. Specifically, because 
fishermen are well connected, they can inform each other when any processor increases prices 
for certain seafood, which in turn leads processors to compete on price in order to acquire limited 
supply. Finally, as will be discussed below, the key aspects of interorganizational relationships 
are linked to the relations between suppliers and processors and help to explain why they often 
stick to each other without a contract. 
Power of Big Customers 
In the eyes of managers, big and resourceful customers primarily in the nation’s 
commercial centers of the Northeast and Midwest have power in the interorganizational field’s 
relationships. Specifically, a small number of big customers are important for competition 
because they impact product prices and drive processors to compete on price among each other 
as they control ample financial resources. Big customers buy products in very large amounts and, 
therefore, they can negotiate the price of the products in their own terms as explained by a 
manager below:  
You’ll have what I call a major buyer like a person out of Chicago. (…) Like maybe 
Philadelphia who is a major user of gulf shrimp. He can impact – not greatly impact – but 
impact the price. If he has a certain price that he needs, then he can raise prices at the 
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dock to get it. But these guys, normally, what they’ll do is they’ll wait until supply is 
greater than demand and they’ll buy at better pricing. (…) (Interviewee 2) 
 
According to managers, these big and resourceful customers have great inventory 
capacity as well. Therefore, they buy seafood processors’ products at lower prices when they are 
in season and there is abundant supply and sell them at high profits during the off-season when 
there is a shortage of supply.  Moreover, managers perceive that generally small local processors 
experience cash limitations and thus, big customers with ample financial resources gain a 
competitive advantage over them. Neither do relatively less resourceful processors readily have 
required cash flow nor can they easily get credit from loaning institutions as explained by a 
manager:  
One of the big problems that we have in our industry is that there's not enough capital 
invested in our industry. Banks won't loan money, won't up credit cards, so therefore, we 
are extremely under-capitalized in our industry. Which will force a small processor to sell 
shrimp at cost, just to roll over money. (…) (Interviewee 22) 
 
Therefore, managers state that their abundant resources and storage capacities enable 
these big customers to purchase in large amounts and to drive processors towards price 
competition. In the interviewed managers’ view, some larger processors also benefit from the 
limited financial resources smaller processors have and their resulting inability to buy large 
quantities. Specifically, they may wait until a small processor gets desperate and sells their 
inventory at or below their costs just to roll over money as seen below (because while the price 
of seafood increases when the season is over, keeping inventory also becomes costlier over 
time):  
(…) Chicago, we've got some really, really big companies up there that purchases our 
shrimp.  And they own nothing more than a telephone, and a large checking 
account. (…) When they see our price bottom out, they'll come in and buy large, large 
quantities from our packers.  And they'll hold it and hoard it, and wait for the price to 
rise. (…) (Interviewee 23) 
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Industry Organizations as Platforms for Relations and Networking 
In my study, the managers perceive industry organizations, including government 
agencies and trade associations, to be another key characteristic of the interorganizational field of 
relationships. According to managers, associations are important for processors to broaden their 
network, and initiate and continue relations with other processors and other organizations in the 
field. Managers get together with each other as well as with representatives of some of the field’s 
other organizations on occasions such as industry organization meetings or industry-wide events 
(e.g., trade shows, seafood festivals), which serve as a platform for processors to network as 
illustrated by two managers below:  
Well interactions can come from meetings from processors that belong to certain 
organizations like Association 2 or Association 3. These aren’t – these could be 
organizations that have both processors, and docks and retailers so some of these 
organizations aren’t just necessarily processors but ultimately these organizations get 
together (…) (Interviewee 11) 
 
I always use Association 1 for information, contacts.  They're always going to the trade 
shows.  I've done trade shows with Association 4 [agriculture], Association 1 [seafood 
promotion], which is very important.  You know, Boston Seafood Show, and different 
trade shows, regional.  And then you've got to work with your politics, you know, you've 
got to work with your marketing – Association 5.  Let them know who you are and where 
you're at. (…) Because you have to have some political connections and everything.(…) 
(Interviewee 14) 
 
  The members of these industry organizations include the managers of processors that 
operate in different industry segments and representatives of other interest groups such as 
fishermen, docks, restaurants, and distributors. Consistent with their perception of the 
fragmentation of the industry, managers and industry association representatives explain that 
different processors and representatives of interest groups cooperate with each other depending 
on the issue at hand. For instance, during board meetings of industry organizations, when the 
discussion is about an issue that relates to the entire Southern State’s seafood industry, all 
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processors lock in together and cooperate against companies that sell imported seafood or other 
interested parties such as recreational fishermen. When the discussion involves conflicting 
interests of industry segments, for example the crab versus the shrimp industry segments, 
processors of the same industry segment cooperate against the ones in other industry segments. 
Finally, in discussions about issues that are relevant to a particular industry segment, for 
instance, official season start and finish dates or time allotted for inshore versus offshore fishing 
for shrimp, processors in the shrimp industry segment compete among each other. For instance, a 
manager illustrates how they cooperated with other processors in the shrimp industry segment to 
pass a legislation against imported seafood: 
So, one of the areas we all cooperate, is when we see legislation that may be put in place 
that would have a negative impact on our industry.  (…)  A significant example would be 
-- the importation of crawfish over the years has been a big issue, when it comes to 
imports -- and even shrimp over the last few years.  And so, we've participated with 
others in the industry, because we have a shrimp processing plant here.  (…) So there's 
legislation that impacts -- and this is at the federal level -- imported shrimp, and how it 
impacts our industry.  So, we would cooperate with other shrimp packers, to let our 
legislators, both at the state level and the federal level, know that certain bills is either 
good or bad for the industry. (Interviewee 8)  
 
  Overall insights this category offers include managers’ interpretations of the 
characteristics of the interorganizational field, including, resource availability, and the roles of 
key elements of the field. These characteristics are interrelated with and are central to 
interorganizational relations and the dynamics of competition, cooperation, and coopetition as 
they set the stage for and impact how managers plan and implement their relations with other 
organizations. Characteristics such as the abundance and shortage of resources as well as the key 
elements of the field such as industry organizations, suppliers, and customers may have 
important implications for all types of relationships between firms.  
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Key Characteristics of Interorganizational Relations  
The next category of my findings captures the characteristics that managers interpret as 
key for all types of interorganizational relationships. They develop these interpretations based on 
interactions with other processors and utilize them to form and implement different types of 
interorganizational relations. To begin with, managers consider other firms’ established 
reputation in the market important for initiating cooperative relations. The second key 
characteristic of relationships is reciprocity. The third characteristic is loyalty and it is important 
for relationships with suppliers and customers. The fourth characteristic is geographic proximity 
to other processors that result in these firms to rely on the same sources of supply and the same 
customer markets. The fifth characteristic is social bonds between managers that are developed 
by being from the same family, neighborhood, and/or friend groups. The final key characteristic 
of interorganizational relations is managers’ trust towards other firms, which is formed based on 
prior interactions. I define and discuss each of these relationship characteristics and their 
implications for interorganizational relationships in the interpretations of managers. 
Reputation 
In the study’s context, managers interpret their own reputation as well as the reputations 
of other firms as key to initiate and maintain interorganizational relationships. In managers’ 
interpretations, reputation is not only important for relations with other processors but also for 
relations with customers and suppliers. Managers indicate that reputation is a consequence of the 
quality of a processor’s products and dependability of its service in previous interactions. The 
first quote below illustrates a managers’ interpretation of their own reputation and the second 
quote exemplifies how a manager pays attention to product quality to assess the reputations of 
other firms:  
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You know, this is a service business that we’re in.  And the chef has to know that if he 
calls us at 8 o’clock in the morning and he’s got an important party coming in and he 
orders from us, he’s got to know that without a doubt it’s gonna get to him and it’s gonna 
get to him right. Because we’ve done such a great job, our reputation is that he knows he 
can trust us. (Interviewee 18) 
 
(…) if you’re not really good at your inventory, (…) some of the smaller operators, they 
just develop reputations of being just not good quality and making bad decisions. 
(Interviewee 1) 
 
If managers are not satisfied with a particular partnership, they may ask around the field 
and get other managers’ recommendations about other potential partners. Accordingly, these 
managers make their decisions to choose a new partner based on the known reputations of other 
local processors. Managers of processors that have been in the business for a long time have 
first-hand knowledge about other processors regarding the quality of their products and services 
through direct interactions with them. On the other hand, managers of relatively younger 
processors would need to rely on the reputations of firms in the field that they hear from other 
managers, suppliers, or customers when they are looking for a partner to initiate relationships 
with them. Thus, reputation is widely underlined by managers as an important characteristic for 
the initiation of relations with other firms, especially for newly founded processors:  
Because we're the new kid on the block.  All these other people have been around -- 
they've been in the business, their dad's been in the business, their grandfather's been in 
the business.  (…) We've only been in the business 15 years, so we're the new kid.  So we 
know all the reputation -- just hear all the reputation, you know, "He's a good supplier, 
he's a good supplier, [or] no, don't buy from him."  [We learn other processors’ reputation 
from] Other processors that we interact with.  We become friends with processors, and, 
[we ask:] "Hey, what do you think about their shrimp?" [they respond:]"Oh, they've got a 
good quality pack. (Interviewee 13) 
 
Reciprocity 
In the context of this study, managers interpret reciprocity as a key characteristic of 
relationships between firms. Managers plan and organize their subsequent interactions with other 
processors based on their previous experiences. Due to the variability of supply, processors are 
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not always able to fulfill their customers’ orders and may request help from other firms for 
completing these orders. These relationships are reciprocal because other processors may face 
similar needs due to inconsistencies in the availability of supply and may, in turn, seek help from 
these processors. Reciprocity in relations may also involve referring a customer to another 
processor with the expectation that they will receive a similar favor in return. The first quote 
below illustrates the reciprocal relations in the exchange of resources and the second quote 
exemplifies the role of reciprocity in referring customers:  
(…) Then you're short [of inventory], and you've got to call your buddy [another 
processor], working together, "Hey, can I buy some crawfish from you today?" "I'll help 
you out tomorrow, to cover my ass."  So that's how we reciprocate there, in the live 
market. (Interviewee 14) 
 
(…) if we know of a contract then (…) we try to service that contract ourself. If we can't, 
then we'll give them that favor, but we expect a favor back. (Interviewee 15)  
 
According to managers, in addition to its importance for the exchange of resources and 
favors between processors, reciprocity also plays a role in competitive relations between firms. 
Specifically, processors reciprocate in their competitive interactions with a competitor. For 
instance, if a competitor approaches and ‘steals’ (Interviewee 32) a customer, that processor will 
go ahead and work on regaining that customer and/or gaining other customers’ of that particular 
processor. This is illustrated by the following quote:  
 (…) we try not to get into a price war with the one – I think there’s only one really guy 
that really does that, and it’s not worth it. (…) At one point, he took a lot of our business 
away. We didn’t lower our price. (…) And then gradually went back to those people, and 
he messed up some kind of way, and now they sell more of our shrimp. (Interviewee 13) 
 
However, in my interviewees’ experiences, not all relationships are reciprocal as some of 
their peers fail to return favors in their interactions. Managers still do not discontinue their 
relationships with the managers of these firms in case there might be an opportunity to 
reciprocate in the future. Specifically, because managers interpret challenges with supply and 
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inventory and seasonality as important characteristics of their interorganizational field, they 
expect that there will be many occasions when processors will have to rely on each other’s 
resources. On the other hand, when a previous interaction is not perceived by managers to be 
favorable, they also respond with a similar reaction as exemplified below: 
(…) It’s kinda a back and forth thing. There’s a couple [other processors] that you can 
really trust what they are telling you and you disclose to them when you are doing well 
but you know not everyone works closely. A lot of them are trying to lead you astray. 
The ones that lead you astray, you do the same thing in return. (Interviewee 6) 
 
Loyalty  
In the interpretations of interviewed managers, loyalty is a key characteristic, especially 
for relationships with suppliers in the study’s context. According to managers, the reputation of a 
firm will contribute to the loyalty of its suppliers and customers. According to my findings on 
loyalty, despite the fact that the relationship of a processor with its suppliers is on a non-
contractual basis, both parties are still loyal to each other; this is important because of the 
constant challenges that processors face regarding supply and inventory. Managers noted that 
suppliers are loyal when they are treated fairly by processors, which is related to being paid on 
time and being able to sell their entire catch according to managers. The role of loyalty in 
relations with suppliers is illustrated by the quote from a manager below:  
I’ve got some fishermen that drive 50, 60 miles just to bring their product to me. That’s 
real loyalty. (…) you do have a lot of, lot of fisherman that will pass up other seafood 
buyers. (…), I had one gentleman who lived in Houma. He would leave and go crabbing 
out of South of Houma, (…) drive all the way to [interviewee’s processing facility], sell 
his crabs then go back home. Two, three boxes of crabs. 150 miles he would drive and 
bring me his product. (Interviewee 3) 
 
According to managers, suppliers do not exclusively work for a particular processor, but 
they may have priorities due to their loyalty to a processor. Thus, suppliers tend to sell their 
products to those processors that they have been working with over the years. However, 
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especially when fishermen are experiencing cash problems, they demand that the processor that 
they have been loyal through the years match the highest price paid and purchase their entire 
catch. On the other hand, managers explain that especially larger processors do not deal with 
individual fishermen because they buy and sell in large amounts. Instead, they buy from the 
docks, which are independently owned facilities that purchase seafood from many fishermen that 
unload their boats at these docks. As previously discussed, the relationships between docks and 
processors are also on a non-contractual basis and docks do not work exclusively with a single 
processor. While every transaction with docks is subject to competition between processors, 
processors tend to prefer the docks that have been loyal through the years:   
We buy from the docks. Some of the plants in the industry do buy from fishermen. (…) 
They are independently owned. That’s a competitive market. We buy from certain ones 
that have been loyal to us over the years. Sometimes they sell to other – sometimes we 
have shared docks that sell to my competition. Some of them are 100 percent with me. 
Some I buy from on occasion. (Interviewee 20) 
 
Geographic Proximity 
The participants of my study identified the distance of their firm to other processors as 
well as to suppliers and customers as a key characteristic of relationships. There is a limited 
number of suppliers in each of these neighborhoods and processors need to compete with each 
other to get access to the limited supply. If a firm is in need of a certain product, they first try to 
reach out to other processors who are located close to them in these fishing communities/towns 
or close to the sources that can provide that particular product as explained by a manager:  
I normally call the ones that’s closest to me, because I can’t pay the freight. That’s what I 
do. I think most of them, (garbled) because the freight kills you, right there. (…) 
(Interviewee 34) 
 
Regarding suppliers, managers assert that fishermen are very knowledgeable about 
specific priorities of each processor; so depending on their particular catch they might change 
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their destination processor. Having said that, according to managers and fishermen I interviewed, 
suppliers do not want to travel long distances to unload their boat so they mostly rely on a small 
number of processors that are located in geographic proximity. However, processors that 
purchase supply from multiple docks may choose to work with those located in distant 
geographic locations to avoid the potential risk of price-based rivalry. This is because docks that 
are located close to each other get their supply from the same group of fishermen that can lead 
these docks to compete on price to acquire the limited seafood resource, which would result in 
increased prices for supply for these processors.  The following quote illustrates this 
phenomenon:  
(…) I deal with quite a few docks in different areas (…) I try not to buy from multiple 
docks in one area because then I’m pitting myself against one another.  (…) if I get into a 
situation to where I am committed to this dock for several thousand pounds of product 
and I’m committed to the dock right next door for several thousand pounds of product, 
they start fighting each other with the same—with the price—and they drive the price up.  
And what happens is, I’m the one that’s ultimately paying the higher price. (Interviewee 
36) 
 
Geographic proximity and the fragmentation of the industry are linked because managers 
explain that processors that are in the same industry segment and located close to each other tend 
to avoid cooperating with each other and compete intensely if they have shared customers. Also, 
managers interpret the geographic proximity of their customer markets to other processors’ 
markets to be important in their relationships. Accordingly, processors are more likely to 
cooperate with other firms for exchanging products when these firms are selling to 
geographically distant customers. Hence, geographic proximity of firms and their customer 
markets is important for relationships with these firms as illustrated by a manager below:  
(…) I might feel more comfortable selling a firm out of state though because I know that 
by selling that firm out of state or selling this firm in-state, that firm that is selling it out 
of state is putting that product away from me and so it won’t come back to bite me versus 
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selling this product in state and helping him out, I’ll know that he might be going to a 
customer that is a competitor of my customer. (…) (Interviewee 11) 
 
Social Bonds 
Interorganizational relationships are not only based on contractual relations, but also on 
interpersonal relations through informal communication among organizational actors resulting 
from being members of joint, informal, interpersonal networks. In managers’ experiences, long-
term acquaintances due to belonging to the same neighborhood, social groups, or family may 
lead to closer social relations and friendships. Managers underline that these social bonds have 
implications for relationships with suppliers and customers. Moreover, many processors started 
off their business as fishermen and, therefore, they have developed long-term relationships with 
other fishermen. These social bonds with suppliers are important for processors in dealing with 
challenges related to supply as illustrated by a manager below:  
We have a real good relation with the docks. Like I said, I‘ve been doing this my whole 
life. (…) We’ve got a real good relationship with the fishermen. We know the people that 
bring the shrimp to us so I’d like to think that I have an advantage over most processors 
because I grew up with all these people. (…) So when there is as shortage of shrimp I like 
to think that I can get what I need to get.  (Interviewee 30) 
 
 Based on managers’ and industry representatives’ accounts, social bonds among owners 
and managers of relatively older and more established processors were established by previous 
generation owners. Accordingly, these processors are more likely to cooperate with each other 
for various business and industry issues compared to the ones that are relatively new to the 
seafood processing industry. Additionally, while these processors may compete intensely with 
each other for acquiring supply or for selling their products to customers, they also collaborate 
when another firm is in need of help due to these social bonds. This is illustrated in the 
observations of an industry organization representative and in the first-hand experiences of a 
manager below:  
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 (…) because these areas do tend to be small communities, I mean, they've all known 
each other forever, so, I mean, it's kind of like family in that they'll be very defensive of 
each other and at the same time they'll also go after each other. So, but you know, I think 
when one of them's [processors] hurting the other one a lot of times will pitch in and help 
out too. (Interviewee 5- Industry Organization Representative) 
 
His dad started the company (…) by picking up some of the items that we would have 
eventually thrown away (…) My Dad had a heart attack and I just started sales and I 
didn’t know what I was doing and I called him up and said can you help me sell my 
shrimp and he did. That’s true-friends. When my Dad got better, the next day the fight is 
on. Next day he jacked the price on me and took some shrimp from me. (Interviewee 20)  
 
Trust 
In the eyes of managers that I interviewed, trust is another key characteristic of 
relationships between firms. Trust is especially important in the study’s context because relations 
between suppliers, customers, and processors are mainly on a non-contractual basis. 
Accordingly, managers suggest that they do not engage in business relations with other firms if 
they do not trust that they will be complying with the terms of their verbal agreement. Managers’ 
interpretations of trust are related to business practices and key characteristics of relationships as 
exemplified by a manager below:  
(…) You trade every day with the same people (…) and you can find out which one you 
can deal with when you receive the product, and it's what he said it was.  (…) honor 
between plants, and you deal with the ones that sell you the quality they back up, you 
know?  It's all about quality and availability.  (…) (Interviewee 14) 
 
According to managers’ interpretations, trust is an important factor in relations with 
customers, industry organizations, and suppliers. Regarding transactions with customers, trust is 
key as the industry mostly works through long-term credits. In reference to relations with 
industry organizations, managers who do not trust industry associations are reluctant to 
participate in their events and networking at these events with other organizations in the field. 
Managers cite the way industry organizations operate and how they were structured as important 
for their interpretations of trust towards these organizations. Finally, in regards to relations with 
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suppliers, even though the price might be a deciding factor, because both suppliers and 
processors know that they will continue to have interactions, they try to focus more on long-term 
characteristics of these relationships as outlined by a manager below:  
Same thing I do with the boats, trust and honesty. You know, a man’s word is—means 
more than anything. It’s not a piece of paper, it’s not a contract you put your name on it, 
it’s a handshake deal, it’s word— (…) when you say something, you better do it (…) 
(Interviewee 19) 
 
Overall, my findings regarding the key characteristics of relations underlines a set of 
factors that managers interpret to be key for their relations with other firms, including some that 
are relatively uncommonly found in prior literature on interorganizational relationships such as 
social bonds and geographic proximity. According to managers, these key characteristics are not 
only central to relations with competing processors, but also are vital for relations with suppliers, 
customers, and industry organizations. These characteristics are interrelated with each other and 
managers’ interpretations of these characteristics are formed based on their prior interactions 
with processors and other organizations in the interorganizational field. 
Key Aspects Underlying Identification of Competitors and Cooperators 
 
Another category of my findings includes key aspects underlying identification of 
competitors and cooperators. According to managers’ interpretations, key aspects underlying the 
identification of competitors and cooperators include processing and selling the same or similar 
products, selling products to the same types of customers (e.g., restaurants) in the same customer 
markets, providing high-quality products and services, and being experienced and 
knowledgeable about the dynamics of the seafood industry. In the following, I discuss each of 
these aspects and their implications for interorganizational relationships in the interpretations of 
managers.  
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Producing the Same or a Similar Product 
According to my findings on this node, managers consider other processors that are 
selling the same product categories (e.g., shrimp) or similar products (e.g., head-on shrimp, 
peeled shrimp) not only as competitors but also as potential cooperators because of similar 
processing capabilities. In respect to identifying competitors, some processors focus on the end 
product to classify their competition and because there are not many firms that produce the exact 
same product, their managers consider to have a limited number of direct competitors. Other 
managers define other firms with similar processing capabilities as their competitors, which 
significantly narrows down the number of processors to the ones that focus on a particular 
species and possess particular processing methods and technologies. These narrow 
conceptualizations of competition are illustrated in the experiences of a manager below:  
 (…) We have a high pressure process that we put our product through.  Other, there’s 
another process that is a pasteurization process and they put oysters through it. They 
would be a competitor of ours. And then there’s a third, well there’s a couple others, but 
the third one, which we actually do also was the freezing. (…) it is a product that a couple 
people are trying. (…) And so that would be competition to us (Interviewee 26) 
 
Managers also identify other processors that produce the same or similar products as 
potential cooperators. Because these firms are in the same industry segments, they interact with 
each other more frequently than firms outside of their segment and their interests mostly align. 
For instance, processors that produce the same products have similar resource requirements and 
they can jointly benefit from the exchange of these resources when needed. Hence, managers 
define a group of potential cooperators that mostly consist of processors that focus on the same 
or a similar products as illustrated below:  
(…) After being in 35 years, you build a circle of people you talk with, and have 
acquaintances with through past projects. The circles are processors that do the same 
thing I do (…) (Interviewee 14) 
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Overlapping Customers and Markets 
Participants in my study indicate that they define another processor not only as their 
competitor but also as their potential cooperator if it is selling products to the same types of 
customers (e.g., restaurants, distributors) and in the same geographic markets (e.g., Chicago, 
Atlanta). These processors are considered potential cooperators because they have shared 
experiences that they acquired by serving the same customers and/or markets. They are 
considered as competitors because they target the same customer base and adopt a similar 
distribution system (direct sales to local restaurants versus selling to nationally spread 
distributors). The identification of other processors as competitors and/or cooperators based on 
overlaps in customers and markets is illustrated by two quotes from managers below: 
 (…) obviously if I'm here and you're across the bayou, and I'm looking at you, the 
restaurant five miles away--obviously we're in a more competitive situation. But when 
you get to national sales, it really doesn't matter. (Interviewee 29) 
 
Sometimes a shared customer will bring you together. (…) so you have this dialogue of 
working together, making it happen. Just always sharing ideas and everything. 
(Interviewee 3) 
 
 On the other hand, managers state that some processors avoid cooperating with other 
processors they compete with in the same customer markets. This, managers explain, is because 
processors that serve the same customer markets and thus may have shared customers “are 
competing so closely against each other” (Interviewee 23). This is illustrated by the following 
quote:   
(…) the relationships I have are with people who are not competing in my market. So I 
don’t really have very good relationships with people that compete directly with me and 
my market. (…) (Interviewee 1) 
 
Finally, based on managers’ views, competitors from other states may target the same 
customer market and compete with local processors as well. However, managers argue that local 
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processors know and utilize their advantages, such as good long-term relationships with local 
customers and suppliers. Hence, managers claim that it is difficult for processors from other 
states to get a strong foothold in local markets due to limited supply and the difficulty in getting 
access to customers.  
Product and Service Quality 
Product and service quality is important for choosing partners in collaboration. The 
managers I interviewed indicate that they identify potential competitors and cooperators based on 
other processors’ quality of products and services they provide (such as how they deliver and 
how they receive payment). Managers choose a small group of potential cooperators among the 
processors that they also compete with based on their business practices and their ability to 
consistently provide high-quality products. Managers evaluate the quality of products and 
services, building on an evaluation of prior experiences of interactions with these same 
processors. A manager explains how they identify the group of processors with whom they 
cooperate as follows: 
We have about – (…) eight or 10 of them that we kind of interact like that.  They’ll buy – 
we’ll buy from them when we’re in need. (…) Just knowing that they have a good 
pack.  That they produce a quality pack, and the weight count’s correct.  And so over the 
years, we’ve bought from them, and it’s been good, and so, there’s been no complaint 
from our customers.  So we know that we can continue to do that with them. (Interviewee 
13) 
 
Managers explain that during the season processors are busy and they pay attention to 
product quality and price in choosing their potential cooperators. However, during the off-season 
and when they have more time to make deliberate decisions, managers also pay attention to the 
service quality and business practices for preparation and delivery of seafood for choosing their 
potential cooperators. Price becomes important when the cooperation involves exchanging 
inventory. Service quality relates to the speed and condition of delivery as well as the payment 
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options offered to these processors. Managers’ attention to these qualities in identifying their 
cooperators is illustrated in an example below:  
Some [processors that they cooperate with] are more aggressive, as far as getting trucks 
more rapidly.  (…) The agreed upon price, sometimes if you deal with a guy that gives 
you a better price on some of the bigger sizes, but has a horrible price on some of the 
smaller sizes, you know, you put a pencil to it and you average everything out, and figure 
out, well I'll be better off selling to this guy than this guy. (…) (Interviewee 23) 
 
Product and service quality and the key aspects of interorganizational relationships, 
including reputation and trust are linked, because a firm’s product and service quality over time 
constitute an important basis for its reputation in the interorganizational field according to 
managers. When they are exchanging inventory, managers will assess the reputation of other 
processors regarding their product and service quality to initiate relationships with them. 
Moreover, managers explain that their experiences of product and service quality in a 
relationship with a processor will eventually lead to trust towards that processor. 
Rootedness in the Industry 
Firms’ experiences and the amount of investments they made in an industry are important 
in their decisions related to interorganizational relationships. Managers indicate that they choose 
and prefer to cooperate and to compete with direct competitors that have been in the industry for 
a long time and that have investments in large processing operations; they refer to this group of 
competitors as "good” or "true" competitors (Interviewees 1, 14, and 36). I refer to these 
companies as ‘rooted’, because managers state that these processors are experienced, and 
knowledgeable about the rules of the game, are cognizant of the long-term dynamics of the 
industry and have heavily invested in their business so that they will not easily make short-term 
oriented decisions. Accordingly, managers prefer these rooted competitors as opposed to smaller 
operations that generally have a very short life span as explained by a manager: 
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(…) We’re competing with them more so than with anybody else. So they’re calling on 
the same business that we’re calling on. (…) I guess a good competitor is somebody that 
keeps you on your toes and keeps you doing a good job. (…) but if you can imagine some 
of the smaller operators, they just develop reputations of being just not good quality and 
making bad decisions. (…) And they [these competitors] give us fits because they do a 
good job, so that’s a good competitor, if that makes sense. (Interviewee 1) 
 
In managers’ interpretations, even though these more established competitors are more 
challenging to compete with, they are at least selling high-quality products. Managers believe, 
because of these similarities in business practices, these rooted processors all have similar cost 
structures and comparable investments in the industry. Therefore, these more established 
processors cannot easily engage in price wars because the managers of these firms need to 
consider the long-term sustainability of their firm. Therefore, managers prefer competing with 
such competitors and try to stay away from the ones who do not have much to lose, as explained 
by a manager:  
(…) there's certain competitors that I won't sell against.  Well, some competitors, if you 
sell against them, well they drop their pants, and they do anything to salvage that sale. 
(…) But other competitors, don't drop their price that much.  They know what their 
overhead is, they know what they've got to make.  (…) So you've just got to know which 
ones are sturdy enough to stay in the game, and compete, and not drop their pants all the 
way down when they start hearing, "I'm going to compete against you”(…) (Interviewee 
14)  
 
According to managers, rootedness in the industry has implications for their decisions 
about choosing cooperators as well. Managers prefer cooperating with their experienced direct 
competitors. This is because these processors abide by similar rules and regulations and follow 
similar business practices for preparation and delivery of their products. Thus, managers expect 
these processors to have high-quality inventory and identify them as cooperators as the following 
quote illustrates:  
So, you have a good relationship with them [some processors], and, like I said, the true 
competitors, um – you know, the other guys that do business like I do?  (…) Yeah, from 
the 20% [that this processor won’t cooperate with] we was talking about earlier.  Strictly 
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because I don’t trust anything that comes out of that place. True competitors. Guys that 
have integrity and have good business practices. (Interviewee 36) 
 
My findings in this category underline that managers pay attention to a combination of these key 
aspects for identifying their competitors and cooperators. The conceptualization of competitors 
and competition is critical for any type of interorganizational relationship because the breadth of 
conceptualization may define whom firms will compete and cooperate with and if this will be a 
coopetitive relationship or not. For instance, some managers conceptualize competition to be 
across states, within the state, and within fishing communities and towns, while others 
conceptualize it based on the similarities in product, sources of supply, processing capabilities, 
and markets.  
Aspects of Coopetition for Industry Issues 
Another category of my findings relates to managers’ interpretations of the aspects of 
coopetitive relations related to industry issues. From the point of view of managers, processors 
cooperate with each other for issues relating to the seafood industry or to industry segments, 
frequently as part of industry associations. As these processors that cooperate for industry issues 
also are competitors, these instances can be classified as co-opetition. The first aspect of 
coopetition for industry issues includes managers working together to solve issues that impact 
the seafood industry resulting from various external factors that threaten the natural resources the 
industry depends on. Secondly, the most common type of coopetition for industry issues 
identified by managers relates to working together to influence state- or nation-level regulations 
that may impact the entire seafood industry or relevant industry segments. Finally, managers 
indicate that processors team up with others and other key organizations to promote either the 
entire seafood industry, or various industry segments to create awareness, to promote products 
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and drive sales, and at times to change unfavorable perceptions. I now discuss these each of these 
aspects of coopetition for industry issues in detail.  
Coopetition against Threats to Natural Resources  
Managers I interviewed noted that one way in which processors cooperate for the overall 
benefit of the industry is by collectively working to ensure the long-term sustainability of natural 
seafood resources. They state that firms in their field may cooperate with other processors 
following the leadership of government agencies or trade associations when the industry is 
facing threats from natural factors such as fresh water diversions, pollution, and hurricanes. The 
ultimate purpose of these efforts is to assure the long-term availability of seafood resources, as 
explained by a manager:  
Sustainability is when the people go shrimp, do they damage other supplies of seafood in 
the Gulf?  (…) You might have plenty of shrimp for yourself, and you might produce 
shrimp all the time, but if you destroy turtles, or you destroy redfish, or you destroy 
different things while you're shrimping, then your industry is not sustainable.  Because 
you are affecting the life of other -- of other fish life in the Gulf.  (…) So that is a cause 
that we in the shrimp industry, on the Association 7, that we fight. (Interviewee 13) 
 
According to interviewees, this form of cooperation and the challenges with supply are 
linked because it is more common during periods of shortage of supply because processors work 
together in trying to solve issues that lead to this shortage. For instance, the oyster industry 
segment, which has experienced a supply shortage for years, is highlighted by managers as the 
most organized group of processors who are trying to fight for the survival of reefs and other 
natural sources of oysters. A manager explains the objective of cooperation between oyster 
processors for the sustainability of their natural resources below:  
The purpose basically was depletion, the effects of the disaster and how to protect the 
coast and how to protect the sustainability of oysters, which in turn protects the 
sustainability of other fisheries. (Interviewee 7) 
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In the eyes of managers, the enablers that organize these efforts of coopetition against 
threats to natural resources are industry organizations, including trade associations and 
government agencies. As part of these industry organizations, managers meet and work with 
their competitors for the overall benefit of the industry as they interpret threats to natural 
resources to have important implications for the long-term performance of their own firms. The 
following interview quote illustrates the cooperation among competitors when it comes to these 
issues:  
I co-operate with them through the boards [of directors for Associations 11, 12, and 13] 
that I'm on. (…) And I believe that it's important for us to try to work toward that, that's 
why, you know, we're working toward trying to get this hatchery thing, using these 
different funding sources so that we can continue it on. So, yes, I reach out, work with 
our competitors and--friendly, you know, and some that aren't so friendly--to try to get to 
a goal to extend the longevity of the oyster business in the state of (…) and the Gulf. 
(Interviewee 25) 
 
 Notably, industry organization representatives underline that only after significant 
challenges to their resource base, such as for example major hurricanes, do the majority of 
processors become involved in cooperation for industry issues. During regular times, the 
participation in the efforts of industry organizations is carried on by the managers of a relatively 
small group of processors who are on the board of almost every industry association as explained 
by various representatives I interviewed (Interviewees 16, 17, 38). An industry association 
representative illustrates how key organizations in the interorganizational field get together and 
cooperate in the face of disasters: 
Immediately following Katrina, Association 7 worked with the trade associations that I 
mentioned for crab, shrimp, oysters, seafood in general, Association 1, Association 8. 
And we formed something called Association 9. (…) The size and the scale and the scope 
of that disaster was so great, that they [all the processors] were all involved. (…) 
(Interviewee 37) 
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Coopetition for Regulations  
Managers consider regulations as the rules that processors need to abide by while 
operating in the seafood industry and, therefore, as important reasons for interorganizational 
relationships. The managers I interviewed interpret regulations as one of the major reasons for 
why processors cooperate with their competitors as well as with other key actors in their field. 
This is because regulations facilitate the coordination and control of resource distribution within 
the interorganizational field, and thus are central interests for different elements of the industry. 
Coopetition for regulations mostly involves managers to have interactions with various 
government agencies as illustrated below: 
Cooperation when it comes to regulatory issues. That’s more so done on a government 
state-wide level at certain meetings like shrimp task force meetings, crab task force 
meetings, you know, which ultimately might go to wildlife and fisheries commission 
meetings and eventually they will travel to the legislative session, which will then be 
responsible for passing bills and statues and so forth. (Interviewee 11) 
 
According to managers, the areas of cooperation for regulations include the fighting for 
zoning issues (oil rig versus fishing zones), for season start & finish dates, foreign workers, 
product sizes that can be caught, and fresh water diversions. Additionally, in the eyes of 
managers, a central reason for coopetition for regulations relates to pursuing regulations against 
seafood importers. This is because managers believe that the firms importing seafood have a 
relatively lower cost structure compared to local processors and that they crowd the market with 
products at significantly lower prices. Therefore, processors and other organizations in the field 
cooperate to lobby the government for anti-dumping regulations and tariffs (i.e., additional taxes 
on imported products to protect local firms from imports’ prices that are below the fair market 
value) as explained by an industry representative:  
(…) in 2008 and 2009, the price of shrimp got so low, it was at a 50-year adjusted low in 
the United States and the Gulf, because of imports. And so they petitioned the Federal 
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Trade Commission, "they" being the Association 3, [the Southern state’s] (…) shrimp 
processors, and they had to work collectively to show the economic damage and 
hardship, in order to get tariffs put in place, and to get federal recovery funding through 
something called the Trade Adjustment Act. (Interviewee 37) 
 
According to managers and industry organization representatives, there are many 
powerful actors who fight for various regulations which often conflict with the interests of the 
local seafood processing industry, such as the representatives of recreational fishermen, seafood 
industries of other states, companies who sell imported seafood, and the oil industry. Therefore, 
the members of the interorganizational field cooperate to try and counter these influences and to 
affect the passing of favorable regulations. In fighting for these regulations, processors cooperate 
not only with their competitors but also with a wide range of key organizations in the field, 
including suppliers, distributors, and other industry associations as illustrated by a manager 
below:  
There's some issues that we have to take to our shrimp industry task force that is on the 
state level, that has docks and processors and fishermen. And we're about to go change 
some laws this coming June.  So there is the cooperation of those things. Things that need 
to better our industry. (…) (Interviewee 22) 
 
Due to the fragmented nature of the industry, these coopetitive relationships unfold 
differently depending on the issue at hand. When processors are dealing with regulations against 
imported seafood, they generally get together with other processors as well as with 
representatives of other domestic seafood industries. For regulations setting issues such as the 
season opening dates, which are related to the Southern state that interviewees are located in 
versus other Gulf states, processors tend to get together with other firms, suppliers, customers, 
and industry organizations in the state. However, on the matter of advocating for state-level 
regulations with opposition by other state-level parties (e.g., the interests of recreational 
fishermen), processors that share the same interests in opposition of these parties cooperate. 
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Coopetition for Promoting and Marketing the Industry  
Coopetition for the promotion and marketing of the seafood industry is another aspect of 
coopetition for industry issues in the eyes of interviewed managers. Managers consider 
promotion and marketing of the overall seafood industry to be important for their individual 
businesses, and thus they cooperate with other processors and other organizations in the field for 
this purpose. Similar to other aspects discussed above, industry organizations are considered as 
the main platforms for organizing and leading the efforts of coopetition for promotion and 
marketing of the industry among competing processors and other organizations in the field, as 
illustrated by the following interview quote:  
We've just recently banded together to hire a marketing firm to try and promote Gulf wild 
shrimp. That was part of that Association 10. (…) And we band together to try to 
convince Washington to give us grants, to give us grant money to be advertised as wild 
American shrimp. (…) (Interviewee 13)  
  
According to managers, suppliers, customers, processors, and other organizations in the 
field team up to focus on promoting various features of domestic seafood to educate consumers 
regarding the differences of its qualities compared to the qualities of imported products (e.g., 
fresh caught domestic products are compared to farm raised imported products) with the general 
objective to increase the competitiveness of the local seafood industry. The current node and the 
node on coopetition to deal with threats to natural resources are linked to each other; for 
example, the BP oil spill had a long-lasting adverse impact on the perceptions of customers 
because they perceived the pollution in the Gulf may have impacted the seafood in the region. 
Thus, in the aftermath of this disaster, promotion and marketing activities of the industry became 
a crucial reason for coopetition among processors. Another example of coopetition for promotion 
and marketing of the industry includes the development of programs with industry organizations 
to certify the quality of the local seafood as exemplified by the following quote: 
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We have to market our product like, I guess you are familiar with the (…) the Southern 
state’s certified programs [a quality certification of the Southern state’s seafood through 
Association 1]. (…) We are working on traceability. I handle gulf wild snapper, which is 
a snapper that is traceable. It is a snapper that is caught in (…) [the Southern state]. It is 
caught by (…) the Southern state’s fishermen and (inaudible) but each snapper has a tag. 
It shows you – if you pull up the number on that tag on your phone it shows you a picture 
of the captain, a picture of the boat, his biography and a dot on the map where he caught 
it. (Interviewee 10) 
 
My findings show that there are different areas of coopetition in the experiences of 
managers. While one area involves coopetition for collective issues relevant to the entire industry 
or to industry segments, the other area of coopetition is related to issues concerning individual 
firms. Based on the findings of my study in this category, managers spend their time and 
resources for coopetition for industry issues because they interpret these industry-wide factors to 
have important implications for the performance of their own firm. The interviewed managers 
interpret that due to the fragmentation of the industry, coopetition for industry issues is often 
limited to processors within an industry segment that more closely share interests and needs. By 
the same token, there is limited cooperation for industry issues among firms in different industry 
segments. Also, in industry associations that provide a platform for the entire industry as 
opposed to specific segments, processors from different industry segments fight for the benefit of 
their own segment and become discontent when resources are distributed more towards other 
segments. There also are a number of associations that specifically cater to and represent the 
interests of each segment. Moreover, managers explain that the practices of cooperation for 
industry issues are more common during the off-season because, during the main season of the 
respective seafood species, firms are busy focusing on their own businesses and on competing 
with other processors for supply and for the customer demand they aim to satisfy. 
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Aspects of Coopetition for Business Issues 
This category captures findings related to a second area of coopetition and it covers 
aspects of coopetition among individual businesses. These nodes include a range of aspects of 
coopetition. First, competing processors may buy and sell inventory or they may share each 
other’s docks to cope with supply challenges. Second, processors may co-pack or process a 
certain product for each other to satisfy certain customer orders. Third, competitors may share 
information, for example about fluctuating market prices or about business opportunities. Fourth, 
competitors may cooperate to share new technologies and to solve problems regarding technical 
equipment. The final aspect of coopetition for business issues shows that managers interpret 
coopetitive relations based on their prior interactions with the same partners as they assess the 
dependability of these partners based on trial and error. I now discuss each of these aspects of 
coopetition for business issues in detail.  
Buying and Selling Product 
According to my interviewees’ interpretations, processors buy and sell inventory from 
other firms that they compete with and they may cooperate to share each others' docks when they 
need a certain product size or category. This is widely indicated as an aspect of co-opetition 
between processors by the participants of this study. They suggest that this aspect of coopetition 
has evolved primarily as a way of coping with the field’s pronounced challenges with supply and 
inventory, as explained by a manager:  
We trade products back and forth, we run out of some products and let’s say [another 
processor] (…) has some, we’ll call up say hey, you got some of this you can spare? And 
then they’ll sell it to us, we’ll go pick it up or vice versa, they’ll call us, and say hey, you 
got some of this? (Interviewee 18) 
 
During the off-season and when there is a shortage of supply, or when a processor’s 
customers demand a special product they do not have in inventory, they turn to competing 
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processors to check if they can buy this specific product from them to fulfill the order. As 
discussed in the node on challenges with supply, because the resource availability in this 
interorganizational field is considered somewhat unpredictable, processors cannot foresee when 
they will need assistance from other firms. Hence, in managers’ interpretations buying and 
selling inventory has evolved to be a reciprocal practice, meaning a selling processor who helped 
another one with inventory may in turn need help with inventory from the buying processor. 
Over time, these exchanges are expected to balance out at and to provide mutual benefit for both 
firms, as illustrated below:  
(…) So that [the nature of seafood products] leads to usually having an inventory 
problem, which means that you end up trading with other dealers. So while we try to buy 
or produce everything we want to sell we aren’t always capable of doing that so we have 
to buy excess inventory from other dealers and they, in turn, need to buy from us. So 
there’s a trade that (…) by the end of the year we’re probably, it balances out to zero. 
(Interviewee 1)  
 
Based on my findings, the buying and selling of inventory between processors is linked 
with the identification of competitors and cooperators because processors do not buy and sell 
inventory with every other processor, but rather do they rely on a small group of processors 
defined based on prior interactions for such transactions. My interview data further suggest that 
processors have a condition for this coopetition: they prioritize their own customers and share 
any remaining excess inventory thereafter. Also, processors lacking infrastructure may sell their 
products to relatively larger ones because they lack the distribution channels to customers for 
moving their products on their own or they lack the capacity to keep inventory for a very long 
time.  
Co-packing and Processing for Each Other 
The managers I interviewed indicate that competitors in the field may cooperate to fulfill 
large customer orders that a processor may receive but not be able to fulfill on his own; put 
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differently, they may cooperate to pool complementary capabilities. To accomplish this, 
processors team up with each other either to fulfill specific technical requirements or processing 
needs to satisfy the order, or they may combine packing capabilities due to the large size of an 
order. According to managers, customers that give large orders are generally the big and 
resourceful customers that have a defining influence on the interorganizational field. In addition 
to frequently inducing price competition among competitors due to their substantial buying 
power, these big customers may trigger coopetition between processors as explained by an 
industry representative who used to work in the seafood processing industry:  
If a small processor has an order that he or she can't fill, that they may pool their 
production with another processor to meet an order. (…) It's better to be part of an order 
than to lose the order altogether. (Interviewee 37) 
 
There are meaningful differences between cooperation to co-pack orders and to process 
products for each other according to managers. Co-packing happens when a processor with 
limited packing capabilities to satisfy an order cooperates with a competitor who has the required 
packing capabilities. This typically is the case when packing large orders for customers with 
specific requirements. By cooperating in packing, both processors get access to orders they 
otherwise could not fulfill and they choose to cooperate with one another to acquire that contract 
instead of competing with each other for that order. A manager illustrates this form of 
cooperation between competing processors:  
(…) We co-pack for one another [with other competing processors] (…) certain 
processors have contracts for certain stores and rather than trying to come and undercut, 
uh- you know, like I said it’s friendly competition so at the end of the day even though 
we compete against one another, we also work together, you know, so I might co-pack 
for a factory that has the Wal-Mart contract and I might not be able to ever get the Wal-
Mart contract because of maybe the credit terms they need, or the amount of volume 
exceeds my, ability, which in this case is why I would co-pack for another factory that 
has the Wal-Mart contract because he can’t (…) supply everything that he has orders for, 
so he’ll reach out to, another factory to see if he can supplement for that. (…) 
(Interviewee 11) 
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With respect to processing for each other, according to my interviewees this happens 
when a processor receives an order from a customer but lacks certain processing capabilities or 
the capacity to process a certain amount in the time frame given to them in the order. For 
instance, this may be needed due to the lack of a required technology or machinery. In that case, 
the manager of that processor asks for help from a competitor who has these processing 
capabilities. A processor provides an example of this form of cooperation:  
we share processing, and when we can, or need to. (…) he buys a strong load of big 
crawfish, and he might have -- not have the capacity to do all of it before he starts losing 
percentages to dead loss. (…) So he'll give me the process.  It's cheaper for him to let me 
cook it for him, than to take the mortality. (Interviewee 14)   
 
Finally, managers noted that some processors focus on the distribution and marketing of 
value-added products and outsource the processing and/or packing of their products to other 
processors. These firms refrain from investing in traditional processing and packing capabilities 
because their managers believe these services can be purchased from other processors at a 
comparable cost and instead of buying and maintaining needed equipment, they pay other 
processors to provide these services. From the point of view of the processors who are providing 
these packing and processing services, being able to sell these services is an important benefit 
because they have sizable investments in their equipment and selling extra packing or processing 
capacity to competitors contributes to the returns on their investments. Thus, managers interpret 
that this form of coopetition creates a mutual benefit for both parties involved in this 
relationship.  
Exchanging Information and Opportunities 
According to managers’ interpretations, another aspect of coopetition captures the 
cooperation between competing processors by informing each other about prices, changing 
technologies, developments, industry organization programs as well as business opportunities. 
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Managers collect information from other processors to decide on a price range for their own 
products as product prices may be constantly in flux in the seafood processing industry. The 
following quote illustrates the different types of information a manager sources from competitors 
and how this information is used to assess a firm’s position in the market:  
(…) we learn grading techniques or maybe they have gotten a jumpstart on new 
technology that might be out there that they might be experimenting with or new 
certifications. It kinda all relates back to we all are in this same pool where we share 
information amongst each other. (…) Information about the season. Information about 
prices. What one processor might get for his product compared to what I might get for 
my product and that might differ depending on the region where he is selling and the 
region where I’m selling. Or maybe it might differ depending on how he packs my 
product or how I pack my product. So we share this information amongst each other to 
see what I’m doing wrong or what I’m doing right compared to him. So you know, at the 
end of the day it’s friendly competition. (Interviewee 11) 
 
Managers also indicated that managers may pass on a business opportunity to a 
competitor after establishing that they are not able to utilize that opportunity by themselves. This 
coopetition practice is linked to reciprocity because when managers share information about a 
business opportunity with a competitor they expect their favor to be returned in the future. Also, 
if a processor has more inventory than their demand, they reach out to competitors for them to 
pass this information to their own customers. These instances of exchanging information and 
opportunities for coopetition are illustrated in the following examples:  
Yes we do, we do compete, again on a friendly but cautious basis. (…) You know, we try 
to service that contract ourself. If we can't, then we'll give them that favor, but we expect 
a favor back. (Interviewee 15) 
 
We do [pass business opportunities] converse back and forth on that nature.  If I find 
someone that I can't deal with, because it's not what I do, then I'll pass it on to a few of 
them, or what have you.  And they'll do the same thing.  And sometimes it's just one the 
of processors that we've become real good friends with, like we're holding on to probably 
half a million pounds in inventory, and so he's like, "Hey, do you need to sell any of 
that?"  I'm like, "Sure, sure."  So we send him a picture of it, send it over there, and he 
sends it out to all of his clients. (Interviewee 22) 
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Linking this node to the fragmentation of the industry, according to managers’ 
interpretations processors in the same industry segment have more shared interests regarding 
information and technologies, thus, coopetition in the form of exchanging information and 
opportunities is more common between processors within industry segments. It is important to 
note that managers emphasized that they do not share information that is not easily accessible in 
the market or about their own company during these interactions. Some managers even stated 
that they share inaccurate information with their competitors because they expect competitors to 
do the same, which violates coopetition between these processors. Hence, because varying and 
sometimes inaccurate information is coming from different firms, managers need to combine all 
these pieces of information from various sources to have a better understanding of the conditions 
in the interorganizational field and make their decisions accordingly.  
Sharing and Helping Each Other with Equipment 
In the eyes of managers interviewed for this study, competing processors also cooperate 
for developing and sharing new technologies or for solving problems with their current 
equipment and machinery. According to managers’ interpretations, processors that have been in 
the business for a long period of time are open to sharing equipment and technologies they 
developed with other competing processors, which otherwise might be used to get ahead of the 
competition, as illustrated below. This could be linked to the social bonds that are a prevalent 
characteristic of the studied interorganizational field, as well as to the fact that many of these 
managers consider companies importing seafood as their firms’ major competition. Having said 
that, being innovative, developing new technologies, and having knowledge about new 
advancements makes these processors more attractive to other firms in the interorganizational 
field as potential cooperators. The technologies developed may be useful not only for 
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competitors in one industry segment, but also for other processors in other industry segments as 
illustrated by a manager below: 
(…) we’ve always been somewhat innovative in our approach. And so, that attracts 
people to us, relationships to us. And we’ve always been involved on that cutting edge of 
development. My father (…) drew up boats he drew up conveying systems. Support 
equipment for our high pressure processing. (…) [We gave the technologies my father 
developed] To everyone. We’ve had thousands of people, industry people come and look 
at our process and make analysis of it. And see where it could be applied to not only 
oysters but lobsters and king crab and many other products (…) (Interviewee 26) 
 
According to the interpretations of managers, another motivation for coopetition among 
processors is the need to find solutions to problems with equipment and machinery. The proper 
functioning and utilization of equipment and machinery are vital for a processors’ financial 
viability. Managers consider this to be a reason for why processors tend to cooperate with each 
other, especially during the season when there is an abundant supply of seafood, processors 
cannot afford to stop their operations because maintaining and fixing machines are indicated to 
be costly and time consuming. Therefore, processors help each other out for coping with these 
problems, as illustrated by a manager:  
 (…) a couple of them, that’s what we interact with, about equipment. (…) I have one of 
them that their family been in the shrimp business as long as my family (…) Like if I 
have a part they need, I let them use it and they’ll replace it.  If they have a part I need, 
I’ll, you know – vice-a-verse-a. (Interviewee 35)   
 
Coopetition as an Outcome of Interactions 
In managers’ experiences, cooperative relationships between competing processors in the 
study’s context evolve as a result of prior interactions for assessing the quality of products and 
services and the reputations of these processors. This is important because, as discussed in the 
nodes on the identification of cooperators, processors do not cooperate with every firm in the 
interorganizational field but rather limit their cooperation to a select circle of firms. According to 
84 
 
managers’ interpretations, coopetition with these selected processors is based on the prior 
interactions of trial and error with these firms, as illustrated by a manager:  
There is a list of every seafood producer in (…) [the Southern state]- in every state now. 
So you start calling around and then, you know, if the business practices are good. If 
everybody does what they say they are going to do, if everybody pays their bills, then you 
become a bond. (…) (Interviewee 2) 
 
According to managers, these coopetitive relationships are formed over time. Therefore, 
competitors that are relative newcomers may face challenges with developing these relations in 
the short term as they have to prove their quality as a potential cooperator through “trial and 
error” (Interviewees 1, 2, and 13) when a certain processor is in need of a particular product. 
Managers’ interpretations show that these interactions not only are central to subsequent 
coopetitive relationships, but also are key for the characteristics for developing relational 
characteristics such as trust and reputation.  
Overall, the insights this category offers suggest that competitors engage in coopetition 
for business issues, primarily with a relatively small group of processors, as a result of prior 
favorable interactions. Additionally, social bonds among processors may serve important roles 
for coopetition between these firms. For instance, one participant indicated that the managers of 
a group of processors join for having coffee every morning and these social interactions among 
competitors may lead to various forms of coopetition for business issues, such as exchanging 
information and discussing the joint development of technologies. This node is also linked to 
geographic proximity; according to managers, processors located close to each other mostly 
compete for getting supply, but they do not necessarily compete with each other for customers 
because they may focus on different customer markets. Therefore, these processors may compete 
in the supply market and cooperate in the customer market which is an example for vertical 
coopetition. Moreover, processors that offer the same or similar products tend to have similar 
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processing capabilities, and thus, are likely to more frequently co-pack and process for each 
other, cooperate regarding new technologies for their processes, and exchange market 
information and refer customers that they cannot fulfill the orders for. Finally, the processors 
whose managers consider companies that import seafood as their major competition are more 
likely to cooperate with local processors. 
Aspects of Competition 
 
The final category of my findings consists of the aspects of competition that managers 
highlight in the context of my study. The first aspect involves competition for the limited supply 
as processors compete with other firms to get access to seafood resources to match their demand. 
The second aspect includes some managers’ feelings that they have successfully differentiated 
from other processors with superior operational capabilities. The third aspect consists of 
managers’ accounts of how processors try to avoid directly competing especially with local 
firms. The fourth aspect relates to processors’ common practice of continuously changing prices 
to compete with other firms. The fifth aspect involves offering value-added products that go 
beyond the basic processing to compete with importers. The sixth aspect includes providing good 
quality products for every order and catering good customer service to customers. The seventh 
aspect consists of utilizing various marketing activities to educate customers regarding facts 
about imported products, and unique and superior attributes of local/natural seafood. The final 
aspect relates to competing against fishermen who forward integrate and sell their catch directly 
to customers. I now discuss each of these aspects of competition and their connections to 
previously introduced nodes and categories.  
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Competition for Supply 
The managers I interviewed interpret competition for supply as one of the fundamental 
aspects of competition in the interorganizational field because the seafood processing industry 
relies on limited and unsteady natural resources as discussed in detail above. One of the ways to 
compete for supply is for processors to develop long-term relationships and loyalty with their 
suppliers. However, according to managers, the selling price is an important decision factor for 
suppliers and thus, in times of scarcity of seafood supply processors try to outbid each other on 
price to get access to it. Managers explain that fishermen have a very efficient network of 
communication among each other, so they immediately learn about price changes at different 
docks and processors eventually match the price of any close competitor to maintain the loyalty 
of their suppliers as illustrated by a manager below:  
Now when you find out about the price, you're going to match that price. [We find out the 
prices] 90% from the fishermen. Yea, he might say, "George, look, I'm fishing off of 
Grand Isle over here.  This one's got a nickel more on the 40-50s."  Say, "Just a 
minute.  Let me see what I can do." The first thing you do is you call [customers] to 
check. Make sure he is paying it.  (…) And if he tells me yea, good.  And if he tells me 
no, I have to swallow the loss or the shrimp. (…) (Interviewee 33)  
 
Additionally, managers also consider aspects such as loyalty and reputation to be central 
to suppliers’ decisions which in turn is another key aspect of the competition for supply. 
Fishermen's catch will not always match a processor’s needs, but fishermen want to make use of 
all their catch and their loyalty is very much affected if all their catch is purchased by one 
processor that they have long term relationships with. Moreover, when there is an abundance of 
products the prices go down; however, if processors still offer “good prices” (Interviewee 10) to 
fishermen during these times of abundance, fishermen are more likely to also bring their 
products to these processors to return the favor when there is a shortage of supply. Thus, 
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processors try to consistently offer good prices for fishermen’s catch and preserve the loyalty of 
their suppliers as explained by an industry organization representative below:  
(…) talking to some of the fishermen, (…) most of those guys coming in on their boats, 
they'll be calling each processor, asking what price they're giving that day. And so, 
they're constantly jumping around. One [processing] company told me, they believe that 
if they pay high on a regular basis, that then they get a loyalty and they get better product. 
(…) (Interviewee 16) 
 
In addition to offering good prices, managers also indicated that being able to offer help 
to suppliers with equipment such as ice, gas, machinery, and knowledge facilitates getting access 
to supply. The shortage of seafood resources for species such as crab and oyster and intensified 
competition for the supply in those industry segments are linked to each other. Accordingly, 
during a shortage, processors buy inventory at high prices due to this competition for supply at 
the risk of selling with a relatively lower profit because they need their equipment and facility to 
continue operating to get a return on their investment. Also, one participant explains that his firm 
used to get resources from a single location, but due to the shortage of supply they opened up 
new docks and started buying from other locations which led them to face new direct 
competitors. According to the interpretations of managers, geographic proximity is also key to 
competition for supply as fishermen only travel a certain distance with their catch so they have a 
limited number of alternatives to unload their products. Therefore, managers consider processors 
that are located closely as their main competitors for supply.  
Feelings of Superior Operation Capabilities 
Some of the interviewed managers emphasized that they have a very high opinion of their 
own company and argued that they ignore other competitors because they consider their firm to 
be ahead of competition due to successful differentiation. However, when further probed, these 
managers acknowledge that they still see other processors as their competitors. These feelings 
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are especially common among managers of relatively younger seafood processors because they 
consider the main reason for the lack of competition as their unique and superior processing 
techniques due to their cutting edge technologies which cannot be matched by relatively outdated 
processors. Managers of these processors believe superior operation capabilities result in a 
higher quality of products that they produce. Feelings of superior operation capabilities and 
product quality are exemplified by managers below:  
I don’t feel like we have competition. Cause we’re very unique in what we do here. We 
being a state of the art facility and processing. (…) So being a brand new state of the art 
facility we offer the latest technology where plants who had been in business fifty, sixty, 
seventy, eighty years, you know, they kinda are what they are. (…) (Interviewee 21) 
 
No-one puts out the quality we do. (…) We have a--we have such a high standard here on 
what we put out and what the customer orders. (…) I don't have any competition. Okay, 
we demand highest prices, we're not the cheapest you're going to buy fish from. We pay 
higher than anybody, we demand a higher price on sales. (Interviewee 19) 
 
According to my findings on this node, feelings of superior operation capabilities have 
implications for cooperation because managers of these processors suggest that not only do they 
not pay much attention to other firms, but also that they avoid engaging in any sort of 
cooperation with them. Managers say these preferences might also be related to their business 
style, which involves focusing on their own business and avoiding any interactions with their 
competitors. Therefore, these processors have only limited interactions with other processors as 
well as with other key organizations in their interorganizational field.  
Avoiding Direct Competition 
Another aspect of competition involves avoiding competitive interactions with other 
firms as much as possible, especially because some managers consider seafood importers as their 
major competition and they believe that by avoiding to compete with local processors they can 
prevent further decreases in their profit margins. For instance, some of the interviewed managers 
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argued their firm tries to avoid directly competing in the customer markets that other local 
processors operate in by not selling their products in those markets. In the following quote, a 
manager explains how they focus on different customer markets to avoid direct competition with 
local processors:  
We are not all competing on the same market. (…) Some of us are competing on the 
same market but then again it is all North America. The guys that sell in Canada and 
Michigan and California... (…) We don’t always step in each other’s toes a whole lot I’ll 
be honest with you. (Interviewee 2) 
 
Managers state that another approach to avoid direct competition with other local 
processors is to focus on producing different versions of the same product, such as unprocessed 
live crab instead of processed, which may help to create a niche for their company. Moreover, to 
be in the same distributor's shelves without necessarily competing with other local processors, 
firms may choose to focus on a certain product/package size such as small-size shrimp as 
opposed to large-size shrimp. Also, managers explain that firms can focus on different 
distribution outlets for their products to avoid direct competition with other local processors as 
illustrated in the example below:  
(…) Not that much though, but we do compete [with other local processors] a little 
bit.  We try not to. (…) Because the market is so big. (…) So that's why you can just go 
find another -- there's too many grocery stores, too many other food supply places out 
there.  Go find somebody else. (Interviewee 13)  
 
Avoiding direct competition, the fragmentation of the industry, and geographic proximity 
are linked because managers do not consider processors that operate in different segments as 
their direct competitors because of the fragmented nature of the industry. Thus, focusing on a 
single seafood species and operating in one industry segment is interpreted by managers as a way 
to avoid direct competition with processors who operate in other industry segments. On the other 
hand, managers also indicate another way of avoiding direct competition as to processing 
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multiple species of seafood and operating in different industry segments; this way, firms not only 
avoid directly competing with processors that focus on a certain species, but also can they 
compensate the gap that is due to weaker sales in a species by stronger sales they may achieve in 
other species. In relation to geographic proximity, based on managers’ accounts the processors 
that are located geographically close to each other have more frequent interactions and cannot 
avoid intense competition for supply; thus, they at least try to avoid competing with each other in 
customer markets they operate in.  
Changing Prices 
In my study’s context, managers explain that firms vary product prices to compete with 
other processors. Thus, managers continuously interact with each other as well as with suppliers 
and customers to keep abreast of the frequently changing market prices of seafood. That is, when 
there is a change in the price of supply or price charged to customers, managers learn that via 
their interactions with the managers of other processors, suppliers, and customers and 
accordingly adjust their own prices. A common practice related to changing prices involves 
price-based competition among processors, which involves undercutting each others' prices to 
secure orders from customers. This is illustrated in the observations of an industry association 
representative:  
(…) shrimp processors (…) are very competitive, and quite frankly I think sometimes 
they hurt themselves, because to get the business they'll continue to cut prices, they won't 
hold the line, so they'll continue to cut prices almost to the point of somebody not making 
money just to get the sale. (…) (Interviewee 16) 
 
According to the interpretations of managers, changing prices became a common basis 
for competition in the seafood processing industry following the introduction of imported 
seafood to the US market. Managers explain that companies that sell imported seafood have the 
power to significantly change seafood prices due to their lower cost structure and the large 
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quantity of supply they are able to bring to the US market. In managers’ accounts, the strong 
foothold that these companies established in a short period of time and their ability to impact the 
seafood prices were also due to the limited knowledge of customers about nature of seafood 
products. This is illustrated by a manager below:  
Most of them [imports] compete on price. It’s 90 percent farm raised product which is 
totally different to me but it’s hard to tell when you see a shrimp in a bag in a grocery 
store and say that’s so much different from this shrimp that was wild caught, gulf shrimp, 
it looks the same. (…) It becomes about price to the consumer – to the uneducated 
consumer doesn’t know the difference. (Interviewee 12)  
 
Offering Value-Added Products 
In the eyes of managers, another aspect of competition in the study’s context involves 
offering value-added products. This is the main direction that industry associations are trying to 
lead processors towards because they believe that competing as a commodity against the 
companies that import seafood is very difficult due to the low-cost structures of these companies. 
However, in the eyes of industry organization representatives, a relatively small number of 
processors realize this and offer value-added products to successfully differentiate their products 
from imported seafood to be able to charge premium prices. Processors that focus on offering 
value-added products do more than basic processing to create differentiated products that are 
beyond the seafood commodity traditionally produced and sold in the industry. Some of these 
approaches to offering value-added products are illustrated by quotes from two managers below:  
(…) we take less lobster meat right here and make a patty with it. But it’s an added-value 
product. And we’ve had some success with it in four years. (Interviewee 34) 
 
We try to create products where the value is in -- like, we went to chef (…), world-
recognized chef, to create our sauces.  So we want a premium-tasting sauce to pair with 
the premium shrimp.  (…) we will have shrimp that does not have any sodium 
tripolyphosphate. It'll be chemical-free, so that -- that'll be a niche that we can focus on. 
(…) (Interviewee 8) 
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According to industry organization representatives, especially some smaller scale 
processors (referred to as “micro” processors by Interviewee 16, an industry organization 
representative) achieved success in competing with the companies that import seafood and larger 
local processors by offering value-added products. These micro processors are defined as small 
scale processors that create a niche for themselves and develop successful businesses by selling 
products directly to end consumers without any invasive processes. The manager of a micro-
processor I interviewed explained that by focusing on end consumers, he was able to eliminate 
the majority of direct competition. Because this manager does not consider other traditional 
processors as his direct competitors, he is more open to engage in cooperative relationships with 
those processors in the interorganizational field. In addition, processors create value-added 
products by developing or adopting new technologies. This is linked to coopetition because these 
new technologies often drive firms to share equipment and technical solutions with other 
processors as discussed above. Finally, according to the interviewed managers, some newly 
founded processors that adopt cutting edge technologies for processing seafood tend to focus 
more on selling value-added products as opposed to cutting prices for competition when 
compared to more established ones.  
Competition Through Product Quality and Customer Service 
According to participants, processors compete with others by making sure they provide 
good quality products every time they deliver and offer good customer service to their 
customers, including fast delivery and extended payment periods; this node complements the 
value-added products node discussed above. Specifically, the seafood product that managers 
discuss under this node is still a commodity, however processors try to improve the customer 
experience and add value to their products by focusing on product quality and good customer 
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service. For instance, many interviewees underlined that they sent their inventory to independent 
testing after the oil spill to relieve their customers from doubts regarding the safety of their 
products. Moreover, managers explain that a major way to overcome price competition and to 
retain customers is to especially focus on the service provided to customers, as illustrated below:  
We’re big on service. (…) Delivery is a big part. Having the right stuff. Having the 
product all the time when they need it so one of the things that I do is I don’t pick up a 
customer that I can’t handle but if you can’t get him the product everyday, you aren’t 
doing your job so we try to take and that’s how we maintain some of the customers that 
we have. (…) We never let them run out. (Interviewee 10) 
 
In managers’ interpretations, providing high-quality products and customer service 
distances their firm from price-focused customers and destructive price-based competition. To be 
able to produce high-quality products, managers consider maintaining their firms’ long-term 
relationships with suppliers as crucial. Therefore, competing through product quality and service 
and competition for supply are linked because processors compete among each other to get 
access to high-quality resources, which is central to the quality of their products. Moreover, this 
node is linked to the relationship characteristics discussed above because managers believe 
product quality and service are important for the reputation and trustworthiness of their company 
in the eyes of their customers. Also, because they pay so much attention to product quality, some 
managers carefully choose their cooperators and buy and sell inventory only from other 
processors that they know will consistently supply quality products. According to managers, this 
aspect of competition also captures being very diligent about using proper business practices by 
paying attention to product quality and proper packaging throughout the relationships with their 
customers as shown below:  
(…) the way that we try to compete is just by selling our product for what it is; making 
sure that we pack proper weights. If we glaze our product, then we over pack to allow for 
the glaze to make sure that the count or to make sure that the customer is not just paying 
94 
 
for quality but he’s paying for piece of mind to know that he’s getting down to the penny 
what he’s paying for (…) 
 
Educating Customers and Promotions 
According to the interviewed managers, educating customers and organizing promotion 
activities is another aspect of competition in the study’s context. Accordingly, processors utilize 
marketing activities such as informing distributors, restaurants, and individual customers 
regarding the unique and superior attributes of the local seafood. Managers believe that an 
average customer cannot differentiate between farm-raised imported seafood and wild-caught 
local seafood. Therefore, these promotion and marketing activities are especially utilized to 
compete with seafood importers by educating customers regarding various features that make 
local seafood superior to the imported products. This is illustrated by a manager as follows:  
Researcher: How do you compete against the imports? 
Interviewee: That is mostly done through educating the consumer. Which would be 
through social media, which is having people understand, one, where we sell our product 
to, two, what to look for, why the taste is different.  We also tell the stories of what the 
ponds do, with all the antibiotics, and how it is -- how they're taking apart their own 
countries just for the shrimp. (…) (Interviewee 22) 
 
In managers’ interpretations, the promotion and marketing activities of individual 
processors complement industry’s collective efforts of promoting the entire seafood industry. 
Educating customers and coopetition for the promotion and marketing of the industry are linked 
because many of these industry-wide efforts of educating customers are based on industry 
organization led programs through which processors coopete among each other and with other 
key elements of the industry. In managers’ perspectives, while more resourceful processors 
develop their own practices for educating customers, relatively smaller ones expect industry 
organizations to educate customers on behalf of all firms in the industry. In organizing their own 
activities for promoting their products and educating customers, processors develop close 
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relations with customers through their sales teams. A manager explains below how they try to 
reflect the unique features of their local products in store with an objective to educate customers:  
Focus studies have shown that consumers believe 90% of the time, they believe they're 
eating wild-caught shrimp, but they're not. They're eating foreign shrimp.  So when the 
consumer gets educated that this is wild American, and wild-caught, not imported, they'll 
pick it up every time (…) we put on our packaging, we'll put "wild, wild-caught, caught 
in the Gulf," to just blow it out right at their face, that they see that it's wild-caught, where 
the other ones can't do that. (Interviewee 13) 
 
Competing with Forward Integrated Suppliers 
In the eyes of interviewed managers, forward integration of fishermen recently became a 
common phenomenon in the study’s context. Specifically, fishermen who are suffering from 
increasing costs and dropping revenues, eliminate other levels of the supply chain and sell 
directly to end customers after either a limited processing or not processing their catch. Some 
fishermen forward integrate by incorporating novel technologies on their boats and establishing 
sales channels; others participate in industry organization programs that facilitate a business 
model of selling directly to customers instead of docks or processors. This is illustrated in the 
experience of a fisherman who successfully forward integrated and started selling their catch to 
end customers:  
I didn’t want to just settle for what the docks were paying so we started marketing and 
selling all of our own product off the boat. (…) what we have is something that’s really 
unique (…) - no one producing the way we produce so it gives us an advantage and an 
edge. (Interviewee 6) 
 
Managers of processors suggest that they view these fishermen as indirect competitors 
because they eventually try to market their products to their firms’ customers. While this is a 
common practice in other industries, in the interpretations of managers and industry organization 
representatives it is relatively new in the seafood industry because it has only recently started 
through a program by an industry organization. Some managers do not perceive this program by 
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industry organizations that support the forward integration of fishermen well because they 
consider forward integrated suppliers to utilize a portion of the already limited seafood supply 
and become new competitors for some of their customers. According to representatives, the 
dissatisfaction among processors towards these programs is reflected in association meetings, 
especially by the dissatisfied managers who are also board members of these industry 
organizations. The nature and content of these industry organizations’ programs as well as some 
of the challenges received from processors are explained by two industry organization 
representatives below:  
 (…) micro-processors [that participate in the Southern State’s Direct Program] --again, 
what's happening there is those guys, for a limited investment, can do their own 
processing, basically set it up in a garage, be able to catch--bring in their catch, process it, 
they put a label on it, and it's selling higher because people know it's local and they trust 
it because it's kind of a boutique seafood product. (…) (Interviewee 37) 
 
(…) They [processors] called and complained a lot.  One threatened to sue (…) [us], and 
one of the agents.  But he never did anything.  But – Well, because we were going to take 
all of the -- you know, he wouldn't get any seafood anymore, because it would all be sold 
directly, and so we are cutting into his bottom line. (Interviewee 38)   
 
On the other hand, some interviewees whose firms do not have any shared supply or end 
consumers with these forward integrated suppliers say that they like the idea that these fishermen 
are able to sell some of their catch directly to individual customers and make some money to 
survive because they consider a recent phenomenon of fishermen leaving the industry to be a 
major problem for the industry. According to the interpretations of managers, the processors who 
support the forward integration of suppliers are generally the ones that are located far away from 
these forward integrated suppliers and thus have different sources of supply. Also, unlike the 
forward integrated fishermen that only directly sell to end customers due to the regulations of the 
industry association program, these processors focus on distributors or restaurants. Accordingly, 
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some suppliers I interviewed underlined that some of these processors, in fact, help them for 
processing so that they can sell their catch directly to end consumers.  
Processors follow different practices to compete with importers, other local processors, 
and forward integrated suppliers. When competing with importers, processors tend to avoid 
competing with other local processors, offer value-added products, establish good relations with 
customers, and educate customers regarding the differences of imported farm-raised and local 
wild-caught seafood. In competing with other local firms in the segment, processors try to 
acquire the limited supply by building long-term relations with suppliers, engage in price-based 
competition and/or offering good quality products to their customers. In competing with forward 
integrated suppliers, they try to utilize their influence in the industry organizations and their cost 
advantages due to the larger size. Some managers highlighted that they classify processors that 
are located close to them as their main competitors and focus on these companies as their frame 
of reference in competition. Finally, processors also reciprocate in their competitive interactions. 
For instance, if a competitor approaches and ‘steals’ a customer, that processor will go ahead and 
work on regaining that customer and/or gaining other customers' of that particular processor.  
Summary of Findings 
In this section I discuss the findings explained above and how my findings addressed 
each research question of my study and how this study contributes to the literature on 
interorganizational relationships. To begin with, Figure 1 provides an overview of the findings of 
my study. This figure also highlights how relationships between organizations are embedded in 
the interorganizational field, and how the aspects of competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive 
relationships are linked with other nodes and categories based on managers’ interpretations of 
the field and relations as discussed in detail below.
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Figure 1: Overview of Findings 
99 
 
My first research question was centered on the interorganizational field of the study for 
which I explored the role of managers’ interpretations of the field, its characteristics, and other 
organizations in the field of relations between firms. My findings show that the interviewed 
managers interpret issues related to the structure of their field and highlight the roles of key 
elements of the field, including suppliers, big customers, and industry organizations. Managers 
consider the characteristics and elements of the field to be interrelated with each other and they 
interpret them as central to interorganizational relations and for the dynamics of competition, 
cooperation, and coopetition. This is because these characteristics set the stage for and impact 
how managers plan and implement their relations with other organizations. 
The findings regarding managers’ interpretations of the challenges with supply as a key 
field characteristic in terms of shaping relations between organizations echo the importance of 
resource availability for interorganizational relationships (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). The 
absence of a steady supply of resources and the resulting constant inventory problems are 
important drivers of the various interactions between firms. Specifically, these characteristics 
lead processors to different levels of cooperative and competitive interactions with other firms 
and push them to reach out and establish relationships with new processors, which are not part of 
their traditional interorganizational field.  
My findings on managers’ interpretations of seasonality also show that the factors that 
are important for relations between organizations may fluctuate throughout the year in an 
interorganizational field. In doing so, I contribute to previous research which has shown that 
factors such as demand for products, resource supply, and regulations are key for 
interorganizational relations (Cropper et al., 2008a). Specifically, the findings of my study 
contribute to this line of research by showing that firms may more intensely compete, cooperate, 
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and coopete with other firms in the interorganizational field due to the issues related to 
seasonality, such as official start and finish dates, fluctuating customer demand, and varying 
product prices.  
Heterogeneity of competition within industries and within organizational fields has 
attracted significant scholarly attention in the management literature (Abrahamson & Fombrun, 
1994; Ketchen et al. 2004; Wooten & Hoffman, 2008). Similarly, with respect to my findings on 
the fragmentation in the industry, the interorganizational field of my study is not homogenous as 
it consists of different industry segments in which firms interact more frequently with each other 
compared to firms in other industry segments, follow developments about each other, and co-
develop shared interpretations about the state and the needs of the particular industry segment. 
My findings on the fragmentation of the industry further contribute to the literature by showing 
that the differences across segments of an industry may lead to variations in relations between 
firms. For instance, my findings present that cooperation between firms is often limited to within 
industry segments; because processors in the same industry segments have similar needs and 
thus, there is only limited cooperation between firms in different industry segments. Therefore, 
in industry associations that contain the entire seafood industry, firms that represent different 
industry segments fight for the benefit of their own segment and become discontent when 
resources are distributed more towards other segments. 
The roles of key elements in the field, such as customers and suppliers, in relations 
between firms has received considerable attention in the prior literature on interorganizational 
fields (Barnett, 2006; Parmar et al., 2010). My study underlines specific roles of these elements 
in the interorganizational field for interorganizational relationships, including the roles of large 
and resourceful customers, suppliers that work with processors without a contract, and industry 
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associations. For instance, by showing the roles of various elements in the interorganizational 
field, including suppliers, industry associations, universities, and customers for information 
transfer between processors, my study contributes to research that has highlighted information 
exchange and learning as important motivations for interactions between firms (Cropper et al., 
2008a; Noteboom, 2008). Moreover, I contribute to research on the role of contracts for 
interorganizational relationships (Ring, 2008) by discussing how non-contractual interactions 
that processors have with their suppliers may impact their relations with other processors and 
organizations in the field. Additionally, I show how big customers can influence processors to 
cooperate with each other for exchanging inventory, processing seafood for each other, or co-
packing products to deliver large orders from these big customers.  
The second research question was related to the characteristics that managers interpret to 
be important for relations between organizations as well as the way they make decisions 
regarding their competitors and cooperators. Based on the findings of my study, the key 
characteristics of interorganizational relationships in the interpretations of managers include 
factors that are conceptualized and studied in the prior literature, such as reputation, reciprocity, 
and trust (Cropper et al., 2008a) as well as characteristics that are underlined by the managers 
who participated in my study such as loyalty, social bonds, and geographic proximity. According 
to managers, these key characteristics are interrelated with each other and managers’ 
interpretations of these characteristics are formed based on prior interactions. 
My findings contribute to the literature on interorganizational relationships by showing 
the role of reputation not only for cooperation and for initiation of relations, but also for 
competition between firms as managers prefer to compete with processors that have a good 
reputation and try to avoid the ones with a bad reputation. Moreover, loyalty is considered to be 
102 
 
important for customer relationships, and for customer satisfaction in marketing research (e.g., 
Dick & Basu, 1994), but I also underline loyalty as an important characteristic of the relations 
with other firms and with suppliers. In addition to the established role of geographic proximity 
for intense competition for supply, I show how it facilitates cooperation, especially for 
exchanging resources such as inventory and information. Building on research that argues 
interorganizational relationships are not only based on contractual relations, but also on 
interpersonal relations through informal communication among organizational actors (Ingram & 
Inman, 1996; Marchington & Vincent, 2004), I find that the social bonds between managers are 
important for the initiation and continuation of relationships. I also contribute to research on trust 
by showing its role for non-contractual relations between organizations.  
With respect to managers’ interpretations of the key aspects underlying the identification 
of competitors and cooperators, I extend research on competitor identification by introducing 
new aspects that managers consider as key to defining their competitors such as firms’ 
rootedness in the industry. Because there is no established research on cooperator identification, 
my findings contribute by showing how the same aspects that managers consider when 
identifying competitors are also important in their selection of cooperators. Moreover, my 
findings underline that managers pay attention to a combination of these key aspects to identify 
their competitors and cooperators and they have idiosyncratic definitions of firms they compete 
and cooperate with. I also underline that there is an asymmetry regarding who and what type of 
processors are identified as competitors and cooperators in the customer and supply markets.  
The third research question was related to managers’ interpretations of key aspects of 
competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships they engage in with other firms in the 
interorganizational field. Regarding coopetition for industry issues, my findings show that these 
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types of relationships often take place under the leadership of industry associations, and 
managers spend their time and resources for these issues because they interpret industry-wide 
issues to be important for their own firms. A contribution of my findings involves showing how 
participation in the efforts of industry organizations tends to be limited to a relatively small 
group of managers who dominate the boards of virtually all industry associations. Moreover, my 
findings show that managers’ conceptualizations of coopetition and the firms that they coopete 
with may change based on their interpretations of the issue at hand.  
In relation to the coopetition for business issues, my study contributes to the coopetition 
literature by uncovering the phenomenon that firms engage in these types of relationships 
primarily with a relatively small group of processors that are defined as a result of prior 
favorable interactions and social bonds between managers. To do so, in initial interactions 
managers appear to pay attention to the characteristics of an evolving relationship, such as 
reputation, reciprocity, and trust so that with time they identify this relatively small group of 
processors that they choose to coopete with. I also show competitors that are relatively new to 
the industry may face challenges with developing these relations in the short term as they first 
have to prove their quality as a potential cooperator through trial and error.  
Finally, I contribute to the rich tradition of research on competitive relationships (e.g., 
Chen & Miller, 2012) by highlighting that managers follow different practices to compete with 
importers, other local processors, and forward integrated suppliers. My findings also underline 
the importance of some relatively uncommon aspects of competition, such as avoiding direct 
market competition with other local processors when facing a larger external threat from the 
companies that import seafood. These key aspects of competition are important to illustrate how 
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the key elements of an interorganizational field may alter traditional competitive strategies and 
actions of organizations.  
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CHAPTER 5. DISCUSSION 
The purpose of my dissertation was to understand how managers interpret 
interorganizational fields and relations with organizations, and how these relationships unfold in 
their experiences. Specifically, I studied managers’ interpretations of the characteristics of their 
interorganizational field and relationships, the way they identify their competitors and 
cooperators, and the key aspects of competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relations. The 
grounded theory methodology and my research design to collect and analyze interview data from 
managers and other key organizations’ representatives in a Southern State’s seafood processing 
industry context provided vital insights into managers’ interpretations of their interorganizational 
field and the practices involved in carrying out relations with other organizations. In this chapter, 
I discuss the implications of my study for theory and research, identify areas for future research, 
and discuss the limitations of the study.  
Implications for Theory and Research 
This study offers important contributions to the literatures on interorganizational 
relations, interorganizational fields, managers’ interpretations, and practices. To begin with, I 
contribute to research on interorganizational relationships by highlighting that managers’ 
interpretations of relationship characteristics are influential for both competitive and cooperative 
relationships. For example, my findings show that firms not only reciprocate for cooperation in 
exchanging resources or referring customers, but also that they do reciprocate competitive 
interactions, such as stealing each other’s customers. This is in line with the argument that there 
is only a fine line between competition and cooperation as firms can simultaneously compete and 
cooperate with other firms in their field (Ingram & Yue, 2008). My findings contribute to this 
line of argument by presenting empirical evidence from the experiences of managers. 
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Specifically, my study shows that instead of pre-defining a course of action for relationships, 
managers interpret their interorganizational field, the issue that they are dealing with at the time 
(e.g., the sustainability of natural resources), and relevant relation characteristics to choose to 
implement a proper type of relationship with other firms.   
In prior research, scholars such as Peteraf and Bergen (2002, 2003) called for a 
combination of the distinct approaches to competitor identification that focus solely on the 
industry structure, strategic similarities or customer needs to develop an exhaustive 
conceptualization of competition. Accordingly, my study contributes to the literature on 
competitor identification as my findings show that managers do not focus only on product and 
resource similarities, market and customer overlaps, or industry structure, but they pay attention 
to a combination of these key aspects for classifying their competitors. This is important because 
this integrated approach better represents the complex nature of how managers actually 
conceptualize competition and identify their competitors.  
I also extend research on competitor identification (e.g., Chen, 1996; Thomas & Pollock, 
1999) by highlighting the aspects that underlie not only the identification of competitors, but also 
of cooperators. Specifically, my findings suggest that similar considerations that underlie the 
identification of competitors are also important for the identification of cooperators. For 
example, I show that managers define other firms that produce similar products with comparable 
processing capabilities as their competitors; in addition, managers also identify these processors 
as their potential cooperators because they possess complementary resources and technologies 
and have shared interests. My findings also underline that managers identify a set of firms they 
compete and cooperate with based on their conceptualization of competition and cooperation. 
For instance, some managers conceptualize competition to be against imports, across states, 
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within the state, or within fishing communities/towns and others conceptualize it based on 
products, the sources of supply, processing capabilities, and markets. Building on this argument, 
I contribute to research on competition by showing that firms display different competitive 
moves depending on the type and distinct characteristics of firms they are competing with at the 
time. In my study’s context, firms follow different practices to compete with companies that 
import seafood, other local processors, and forward integrated suppliers. For example, when 
competing with importers, processors avoid competing with other local processors and try to 
outcompete seafood importers by offering value-added products, establishing good relations with 
and educating customers regarding the differences of imported farm-raised and local wild-caught 
seafood.  
Previous reviews on interorganizational relations underlined the importance of paying 
more attention to managers to shed light on how different relations are formulated and 
implemented (Barringer & Harrison, 2000; Cropper et al., 2008b). I contribute to this literature 
by focusing on managers’ interpretations and studying the key aspects that managers perceive to 
be important for competitive, cooperative, and coopetitive relationships in their experiences. One 
of my study’s contributions to coopetition research is that my findings show the distinct spheres 
of coopetition for collective issues and benefits on the one hand and for individual organizations’ 
issues and benefits on the other hand. With a few exceptions, (e.g., Barnett, 2006), prior research 
predominantly focused on coopetition for business issues (Bengtsson & Kock, 2014) and to my 
knowledge prior research has not shown the concurrent aspects of coopetition in these two 
spheres. As concerns the various aspects of coopetition for industry issues, it appears that firms 
cooperate with different competitors depending on the issue at hand. Relatedly, my study 
suggests that managers’ conceptualization of coopetition within the interorganizational field 
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change based on the phenomenon under consideration. Additionally, the findings of my study 
illustrate a range of coopetitive practices and relationships; for example, they show that 
coopetition may involve jointly solving problems with competitors, including finding ways to 
cope with the unpredictability of supply and inventory or dealing with customer orders that may 
surpass the capabilities of individual firms.  
I also contribute to the literature on interorganizational relations by bringing together 
insights from research streams on interorganizational fields, competition, cooperation, 
coopetition, managers’ interpretations, and strategy as practice. My study’s findings show that 
relationships between organizations are embedded in an interorganizational field similar to other 
organizational actions and strategies. Specifically, the type and nature of relationships are 
impacted by the interorganizational field while in turn impacting the field itself. My findings also 
show that other elements in the field, including customers, suppliers, and industry associations 
play important roles such as transferring information, triggering various relations between firms, 
and serving as a platform for networking. Building on this argument, I show that competitive, 
cooperative, and coopetitive relationships are rooted in the field, but how they are formulated 
and implemented are based on managers’ interpretations of the field and organizations. Thus, I 
also bring in insights from the literature that focuses on managerial practices to identify and 
highlight the different types of actions and interactions that they perform to carry out relations 
with other organizations.  
Finally, my findings suggest that the characteristics of an interorganizational field have 
important implications for relations between organizations. These characteristics may be related 
to natural factors that impact the interorganizational field, such as the shortage of supply in my 
study’s context. They may also be related to established relationships or the ways of doing 
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business in an interorganizational field such as the practice of relying on non-contractual 
relations with suppliers, customers, and other firms in the context of my study. In addition, there 
are general characteristics of interorganizational fields that are more common across different 
contexts such as resource limitations, and elements of the field that are important for 
relationships as discussed in the prior literature (Phillips et al., 2000). According to my findings, 
the characteristics of the interorganizational field have implications for competition, cooperation, 
and coopetition between firms. For example, as a result of the seasonality in the 
interorganizational field, during the season firms are intense competitors, but during the off-
season they cooperate for industry issues, especially for the sustainability of their resource bases. 
Therefore, my findings show that research on relationships between organizations should be 
situated in the interorganizational field and particular attention should be paid to the 
idiosyncratic characteristics of the field that these relations take place in. 
Implications for Future Research 
The findings of this grounded theory study also have implications for future research on 
interorganizational relationships. To begin with, the study provides important insights for future 
research on relationships between organizations by offering theoretical links within and between 
categories. These categories are related to the interorganizational field, relationship 
characteristics, identification of competitors and cooperators, and competitive, cooperative and 
coopetitive relationships. Future research may benefit from the findings of this grounded theory 
and further study some of these links.   
Building on the contributions of my study to the literature on interorganizational 
relationships, future research should pay close attention to the characteristics of the 
interorganizational field as these characteristics set the stage for relationships. As discussed 
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above, the idiosyncratic characteristics that are due to the special environment and the unique 
ways of doing business in the interorganizational field, as well as more general characteristics, 
have important implications for how relations are formed and implemented between 
organizations. Therefore, future research on interorganizational relationships should pay explicit 
attention to the the characteristics of the interorganizational field that set the stage for relations 
between organizations in a respective study.  
Future research may also focus on the finding that managers define a group of firms as 
potential cooperators based on prior interactions and explore the determinants and implications 
of this cooperator identification. This research could benefit from the aspects that my study 
revealed that underlie the identification of cooperators in this context. For example, research 
could further investigate the individual and joint roles of industry structures, resource 
complementarities, and customer needs for the identification of cooperators. Also, building on 
my findings as well as the established literature on competitor identification (e.g., Chen, 1996; 
Thomas & Pollock, 1999), future research could explore the similarities and differences between 
competitor and cooperator identification. A joint investigation of competitor and cooperator 
identification would also offer vital contributions to research on coopetition by highlighting the 
overlaps between identified competitors and cooperators.  
To depict the content and processual nature of managers’ practices for performing 
relations between organizations, future research in the strategy as practice literature could 
explore the day-to-day activities of managers and other members of the firm, such as various 
meetings within and between organizations, phone calls, and industry-wide events for initiating 
and carrying out relations with these organizations. Moreover, due to the time and resource 
limitations of top-level executives in large firms, other organizational members such as mid-level 
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managers and sales associates, may be involved in the formation and implementation of relations 
with organizations including customers, suppliers, promotion agencies, or distribution channels. 
Future research could investigate the roles of these employees as boundary spanners and explore 
the differences between interorganizational relations that are formed by different organizational 
members.  
Finally, future research can further explore managers’ conceptualizations of competition, 
cooperation, and coopetition and shed light on the way they make decisions for choosing 
between these types of relationships. Especially, the limited research on coopetition can be 
extended by looking into similarities and differences in managers’ decision-making processes of 
coopetition for industry and business issues. The insights of the present study can inform future 
research that investigates the determinants and outcomes of coopetition and that seek to identify 
practices managers utilize to carry out these relationships. Most importantly, future research is 
needed to elucidate the factors leading to coopetition for industry issues and their implications 
for other relationships and for the performances of participating firms as well as the collective 
performance of the industry.  
Limitations of the Study 
I note that there are some limitations of this study, which are not uncommon in similar 
research designs that are associated with the context of study as well as the methodology of 
choice. A key concern regarding the limitations of this study relates to the generalizability of my 
findings due to the particular characteristics of the interorganizational field in the study’s 
context, which set the stage for relationships and may vary in other industry contexts. For 
example, the characteristics of the interorganizational field and resulting relations between 
organizations may differ in relatively larger industries that are more geographically spread with 
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limited personal interactions between managers. Moreover, as discussed above, some 
characteristics of the field I studied may be relatively particular to this context and some of the 
relationships that are due to these characteristics may not be observed in other contexts. Also, 
this study focused on a single industry context, and it is possible that there are differences in 
interorganizational relationships between organizations in the same industry versus the ones that 
operate in different industries. Also, the processors that I focus on in this study are small 
processors. Large firms might differ regarding how interorganizational relations are formulated 
and implemented. For instance, as discussed above, in addition to top-level executives that I 
focused on in this study, managers at other levels and in various capacities may be involved in 
carrying out certain interorganizational relationships.   
With respect to the grounded theory methodology, as explained by Strauss and Corbin 
(1998), the researcher becomes an object of the study and his focus on particular topics, may 
have implications for the emerging grounded theory. Similarly, I approached data collection with 
a particular focus due to the specific research questions I was seeking to answer. For instance, 
my research questions’ focus on interorganizational relationships between firms in the study’s 
context might have inhibited potential findings regarding the roles of other key influential 
organizations and individuals in the field.  Finally, interorganizational relationships are 
developed over time through a process (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994), however, I collected my data 
at one point in time due to my research design. In doing so, my study might be potentially 
leaving out some insights regarding how interorganizational relationships evolve as a result of 
continuous interactions. For example, my research design did not allow me to capture the 
formation processes of relations between organizations and how firms switch between 
competitive and cooperative relationships.    
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Conclusion 
 The purpose of this study was to develop a theory of the phenomenon of how managers 
interpret interorganizational fields and relations with other organizations, and accordingly, how 
relationships unfold in their experiences. The context of the seafood processing industry in a 
Southern US state enabled me to explore managers’ interpretations of their interorganizational 
field and their practices for building and maintaining relationships with other organizations in 
their field. The emergent theory synthesized managers’ interpretations of the characteristics of 
the field and relationships, key aspects of identifying competitors and cooperators, coopetition 
for industry and business issues, and competition. In doing so, the emergent theory contributes to 
management research in general and specifically to the literatures on interorganizational 
relationships, interorganizational field, managerial interpretations, and strategy as practice.  
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APPENDIX: INTERVIEW GUIDE 
Final Interview Guide (as of 04/03/2015) 
1. Can you briefly tell me about your background with the company (also ask 
responsibilities for managers other than CEO or owner)? 
2. Can you please (in a nutshell) describe how business works in this industry?  
a. How do you stay current about developments in the industry?  
3. What do interactions among seafood processors in the industry look like?  
a. Who do you consider your major competition?  
b. In your experience, how do firms compete in this industry?  (If needed, follow-up 
with: What do you do to compete?) Can you give some examples from your 
personal experience?  
4. Do you also cooperate with some of the firms in your industry?  
a. If so, how would you describe the nature of any such cooperation? 
b. Can you give some examples from your personal experience? (If needed, follow-
up how does your cooperation impact your competition?)  
5. Could you describe what kinds of interactions you have with other parties or institutions 
relevant to your industry (such as industry associations, governmental agencies)? (Follow 
up if needed: universities, marketing, advertising, or consultancy firms)  
a. What is the role of LSPMB and other industry associations and government 
agencies in the industry? (Follow up: how do they distribute resources)?  
b. Can you give some examples of such interactions and their 
implications/consequences for your firm?  
c. What is your involvement in these interactions? 
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